Re: Message takeover attacks against S/MIME

Phillip:

>> I am hearing interest in these topics (a combination of things on this list and side conversations).
>> 
>> (1) Specify the way to use authenticated encryption in S/MIME.  Note that it is already done for CMS.
>> 
>> (2) Specify conventions for AES-CCM, AES-GCM, and ChaCha20 with Poly1305 authenticated encryption algorithms.
>> 
>> (3) Specify conventions for using Curve25519 and Curve448 for key agreement.
>> 
>> (4) Specify conventions for using the CFRG chosen curves for elliptic curve digital signature.
>> 
>> (5) Specify a way to use PGP public keys in addition to PKIX certificates.
> 
> 
> If we are going to do this, I would like to also look at automating
> enrollment for a CA issued certificate.

I agree that getting and renewing the certificate is far too difficult.

[snip]

> That said, I will note that items 1,2,3,4 are arguably already in
> scope for CURDLE.

To use RFC 5083 and RFC 5084, we need to do quite a bit more than just add algorithms to a registry.  In my opinion, we would need to produce S/MIME) Version 3.3.

5083 Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) Authenticated-Enveloped-Data
     Content Type. R. Housley. November 2007. (Format: TXT=22810 bytes)
     (Updates RFC3852) (Status: PROPOSED STANDARD) (DOI:
     10.17487/RFC5083) 

5084 Using AES-CCM and AES-GCM Authenticated Encryption in the
     Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS). R. Housley. November 2007.
     (Format: TXT=21821 bytes) (Status: PROPOSED STANDARD) (DOI:
     10.17487/RFC5084)

> I am a big fan of doing (5). the point is to get people using end to
> end encryption, not use one particular approach.

At least one person agrees.  That is how it got on the list.

Russ

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