Re: Message takeover attacks against S/MIME

Hi Russ,

On 09/03/2016 04:53, Russ Housley wrote:
> Alexey:
>
>>> Anything else?
>> It would be good if "Domain-based signing and encryption using S/MIME"
>> (draft-melnikov-smime-msa-to-mda-04) can also be included.
> Can you summarize the things that you need that are not supported by RFC 3183?
>
> 3183 Domain Security Services using S/MIME. T. Dean, W. Ottaway. October
>       2001. (Format: TXT=57129 bytes) (Status: EXPERIMENTAL) (DOI:
>       10.17487/RFC3183)
My draft is effectively a revision of RFC 3183:

Changes from RFC 3183

    Unlike RFC 3183, subject names of domain signing/encrypting X.509
    certificates don't have to have a specific form.  But Subject
    Alternative Names need to include URIs for domain being protected.

    A new signature type was added for the case when MSA signs/encrypts a
    message on behalf of a user with a user specific key.

    Incorporated erratum 3757 resolution.

    Updated references and some minor editorial corrections.

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