Re: [smime] Key lookup service via draft-bhjl-x509-srv-00
Wei Chuang <[email protected]> Thu, 24 Mar 2016 06:34:50 -0700
| Newsgroups | gmane.ietf.x509,gmane.ietf.smime |
|---|---|
| Message-ID | <CAAFsWK3KS9HnNpQdkdY7skBhMaGz9h1rbXTCZn6Nj-+TdNPu1w@mail.gmail.com> |
On Thu, Mar 24, 2016 at 5:25 AM, Miller, Timothy J. <[email protected]> wrote: > > Could Yahoo! (in this example) not provide a means for their users to > update > > the key lookup service? As the user is authenticated through their UI, > he or > > she could upload the keys they want in a secure way. (A realistic > > deployment caveat might be that Yahoo! puts some restrictions on e.g. > > Yahoo! might not support self-signed, weak key sizes etc). One might > argue > > Yahoo! wouldn't want to provide a key service, but then that's fine. > Without > > the SRV RR, things should be defined to fall back to the current state of > > things. > > First, consider a user forwarding mail from Yahoo! to some other service, > or using a single client to access multiple mailboxes but replying from a > single address. Who attests to what in these cases? > I don't believe a key service complicates these scenarios, rather as you say the underlying PKI 'who' question does. > > Second, by adding provider-side infrastructure you're increasing the cost > of providing the mail service with no direct benefit to the mail provider > himself. There's an indirect benefit in which you're making the service > slightly more attractive to a certain niche of users, but that's probably > not even measurable as that niche is exceedingly small. IOW, there's no > incentive. > Providing a key service would be up to the provider. Some might choose not to, and thereby solely use MUA based distribution. Where a key service is provided, I would think there could be these benefits: * Keep private the initial conversation * Certificate renewal upon expiry or similarly when revoked * Describe the allowed trust anchor (for verification which shouldn't be all the time) * Potentially handle email address name variants e.g. subaddressing, capitalization -Wei > > My advice is to keep it as simple as possible. MUAs interact directly > with users, so it should be MUAs that provide assurance, not mail > providers. This relieves the provider from having to worry about it, and > users can opt in or out at will using any mail provider or key > infrastructure they choose (up to and including roll-your-own). > > -- T > > > _______________________________________________ pkix mailing list [email protected] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix