Re: Identified Work Items and Discussion Summary (was: possible new pkix and/or smime work)
Tom Ritter <[email protected]> Fri, 1 Apr 2016 13:16:21 -0500
| Newsgroups | gmane.ietf.x509,gmane.ietf.smime |
|---|---|
| Message-ID | <CA+cU71k=78xwt0sD-jHhLFG-+fGHLTbYUrpNv-G6nzGjCZEhcg@mail.gmail.com> |
On 1 April 2016 at 12:47, Wei Chuang <[email protected]> wrote: > There's also an experimental RFC7508 "Securing Header Fields with S/MIME" > plus RFC5751 mentions using message/rfc822 though that is not completely > specified. One issue likely common with these approaches is keeping private > the sender and recipient(s). I've pitched the idea of doing some form of > onion routing to mitigate that. Hopefully these are things folks would be > interested in pursuing. I'm super interested in that. I've been interested and worked casually on mix networks for a bit, for strong anonymity. But there are lots of problems there, including reliability (and throughput) of nodes, abuse, and of course the 'going dark on spam' problem . Lately I've been thinking about something weaker and potentially more deployable. Model it as four parties at play: Sender, Receiver, Sender Provider, Receiver Provider. Right now each party sees everything - goal is to reduce that. One idea I've had is that each provider can publish a [email protected] address. You encrypt a message to [email protected] specifying [email protected] as the recipient with the body additionally encrypted (or not) to Alice. Google decrypts and then forwards to Alice. This makes the Recipient private from the Sender Provider, and doesn't impact any sort of incoming spam controls. (It does impact outgoing spam controls to a certain degree.) Another idea is that the sending provider can strip all identifying information from the message as it passes through them. The information is contained inside the encrypted envelope to the final recipient. Sending provider will still know who's sending the message (SMTP authentication) - but the Receiving Provider doesn't learn the Sender. You've got lots of concerns about impersonation here, but I think we could device a cryptographic protocol that gives the Sending Provider assurance the Sender isn't trying to masquerade as someone else. (The simplest one would just have the Sending Provider encrypt the Sender to the Recipient.) -tom _______________________________________________ pkix mailing list [email protected] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix