Re: [Technical Errata Reported] RFC2631 (5954)

I could maybe see making this Hold For Document Update, as it would
probably require some discussion, and it's hard to say that this was an
omission at the time of original publication.

-Ben

On Thu, Jan 02, 2020 at 12:42:20PM -0800, RFC Errata System wrote:
> The following errata report has been submitted for RFC2631,
> "Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement Method".
> 
> --------------------------------------
> You may review the report below and at:
> https://www.rfc-editor.org/errata/eid5954
> 
> --------------------------------------
> Type: Technical
> Reported by: Paul Janson <[email protected]>
> 
> Section: 2.1.5.
> 
> Original Text
> -------------
>      1. Verify that y lies within the interval [2,p-1]. If it does not,
>         the key is invalid.
>      2. Compute y^q mod p. If the result == 1, the key is valid.
>         Otherwise the key is invalid.
> 
> 
> Corrected Text
> --------------
>      1. Verify that y lies within the interval [2,p-1]. If it does not,
>         the key is invalid.
>      2. Compute y^q mod p. If the result == 1, the key is valid.
>         Otherwise the key is invalid.
> |    3. Verify that y does not match g.
> 
> 
> Notes
> -----
> Validating that (g == received y) needs to be an additional exclusion to the valid range [2,p-1]. If party 'a' accepts received public key 'yb' matching 'g', then ZZ matches  public key 'ya'. i.e. if yb = 2, then xb = 1, therefore ZZ = ya^1 = ya
> 
> Instructions:
> -------------
> This erratum is currently posted as "Reported". If necessary, please
> use "Reply All" to discuss whether it should be verified or
> rejected. When a decision is reached, the verifying party  
> can log in to change the status and edit the report, if necessary. 
> 
> --------------------------------------
> RFC2631 (draft-ietf-smime-x942-07)
> --------------------------------------
> Title               : Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement Method
> Publication Date    : June 1999
> Author(s)           : E. Rescorla
> Category            : PROPOSED STANDARD
> Source              : S/MIME Mail Security
> Area                : Security
> Stream              : IETF
> Verifying Party     : IESG

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