RE: question on key localizaton

> hina> So it is 99 % probable that secName1 = secName2 = secName3 
> = ... secName-n and K1 = K2 = K3 = ... Kn.
> 
> Only for INFORMs, mind you, would this be the case.  If you broke into
> an agent, you would be able *only* to steal useful keys for sending
> INFORMs to a receiver.  It would not enable you to use K1 to access
> information from machine 2.  In other words, K1 in your scenario would
> *only* be used for sending that inform.

Ok, This is the point.
I took it for granted that the above common secName and its key can also be used for get or set request
by some evil agent to a righteous agent.
This can be blocked by access control mechanism, right ?

Well, I apologize for all these irritating guesses and questions but I promised my boss to implement 
snmpv3 agent engine from scratch within 2 months,
and I have five kids to feed.    ;-)