Re: [midcom] SNMPv3 as MIDCOM protocol: Opinions?
Michael Thomas <[email protected]>
| Newsgroups | gmane.ietf.snmpv3 |
|---|---|
| Message-ID | <[email protected]> |
Randy Presuhn writes: > Hi - > > > From: Michael Thomas <[email protected]> > > Message-ID: <[email protected]> > > Date: Mon, 9 Dec 2002 17:08:25 -0800 (PST) > > To: Wes Hardaker <[email protected]> > > Cc: Michael Thomas <[email protected]>, [email protected], > > "Harrington, David" <[email protected]>, > > "Chris Elliott" <[email protected]>, > > "Wijnen, Bert (Bert)" <[email protected]>, > > "[email protected] (E-mail)" <[email protected]> > > Subject: Re: [midcom] SNMPv3 as MIDCOM protocol: Opinions? > > In-Reply-To: <[email protected]> > > References: <6D745637A7E0F94DA070743C55CDA9BA256F06@NHROCMBX1.ets.enterasys.com> > > <[email protected]> > > <[email protected]> > > <[email protected]> > ... > > I'm not saying that IPsec would be a good fit; > > quite the opposite, actually. I'm arguing that app > > layer security without key management is, well, > > useless was the first thing that popped into my > > mind, but I should probably be more charitable. > > It really makes deciding what to do at any sort > > of scale *very* hard given the inferior choices. > > > > As I said, for MIDCOM this is a very distinct > > negative for SNMPv3 as a choice, all other > > things being equal. Any other wg considering > > SNMPv3 as the basis for their protocol would be > > well advised to take that into consideration. > ... > > Could you give an example of a protocol in use that does > initial key distribution, key update, authentication and access > control management well? (All four, not just one or two.) > With SNMPv3 USM+VACM, we get three out of the four. If there > were a good way to get all four, I think the WG would like > to know about it. Irrelevant, but IKE,KINK/IPsec and TLS fit your definition. This working group decided for its own reasons that app layer auth/priv/authz was required. As such, none of the usual suspects can be used for key management for those SA. We are left with a void. This manifestly causes trouble with generally poorly conceived and reviewed stopgaps. Trying to say that the world is an imperfect place therefore lets bury our head in the sand is a huge cop out. In the context of MIDCOM, SNMPv3 should be dismissed out of hand because it doesn't have key management. It's that serious. Mike