Re: Matters arising was: Re: syslog WG meeting minutes (proposed)
"tom.petch" <[email protected]> Wed, 5 Aug 2009 17:32:10 +0200
| Newsgroups | gmane.ietf.syslog |
|---|---|
| Message-ID | <001301ca15e1$ff494fe0$0601a8c0@allison> |
----- Original Message ----- From: "Chris Lonvick" <[email protected]> To: "tom.petch" <[email protected]> Cc: "syslog" <[email protected]>; <[email protected]> Sent: Monday, August 03, 2009 3:52 PM > On Mon, 3 Aug 2009, tom.petch wrote: > > > Picking up on the point of commonality between DTLS for IPFIX, ISMS and syslog: > > > > - having a common statement of how to check certificates would save work here > > and elsewhere ie get draft-hodges-server-ident-check-00.txt to include as a > > minimum the cases covered in syslog-tls and get that I-D progressing onto > > standards track so as to use it as a normative reference (can we steal it from > > apps into security:-). > > Sounds good. > > > > > - syslog has tls as RECOMMENDED transport at the insistence of the IESG because > > it has flow control and the others do not. DTLS over UDP has no flow control > > and so, by analogy, I would expect it to be unacceptable to the IESG ie it will > > have to be DTLS over SCTP that will have to be there as well or instead > > (something I did not think of in 2006). > > I'm not that familiar with DTLS. Can we just specify how to put syslog > over it, or do we need to also state how it is to be layered above a > substrate tranport such as sctp? My preference would be to just define > syslog/dtls and then have a pointer back to RFC 5424 (syslog Protocol) > Section 8.6. (Congestion Control) which spells out the reason for choosing > properly. I'm really hoping that we don't have to create a document for > anything other than syslog/dtls. > > > - having written a DTLS I-D (and looked at many more), I am inclined to agree > > with Wes that there will not be much in common (apart from certificate > > checking - see above) > > If we _can_ just do XYZ/dtls (without having to go through the lower > substrate definition) then the pieces of work are (imho): > - state how the specification addresses the threats identified in > syslog/tls, > - explain certificate checking (as you note above) > - explain how records will be separated. > > Can anyone think of anything else that needs to be defined in this work? > > Tom, can a document just do XYZ/dtls, or does it also _really_ need > definition for the substrate? I can write such a document, but will the IESG accept it? I don't know; I was surprised at Magnus's DISCUSS two years ago on syslog-protocol that led us to RECOMMEND a TLS transport, as opposed to UDP, on the grounds that it offered congestion control and I doubt that concerns about congestion have decreased since then. So I am anticipating that syslog over DTLS with no mention of underlying transport cannot be RECOMMENDED; perhaps a question for our AD to ponder, and bounce off his transport area opposite numbers. As to other points, my list, of what xxx-over-DTLS must consider is - authentication - connection set up - connection termination - choice of ciphersuite - choice of (D)TLS extensions - delineation of datagrams - invoking DTLS - fragmentation and nowadays I must add - congestion control. Tom Petch > Thanks, > Chris > > > > > Tom Petch <snip> _______________________________________________ Syslog mailing list [email protected] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/syslog