Re: FW: I-D Action:draft-ietf-syslog-dtls-00.txt

>>>>> "Eliot" == Eliot Lear <[email protected]> writes:

    Eliot> Why is this necessary?  Isn't it sufficient to import and
    Eliot> make use of a self-signed certificate?  Isn't it easy
    Eliot> enough to run OpenSSL on a Mac or linux box and import the
    Eliot> stuff?  I could see an argument for usability concerns, but
    Eliot> that's not sufficient grounds for a MUST.

    Eliot> An aside about your 2119 language: I haven't reviewed all
    Eliot> of it, nor am I an 2119 expert, but I can say that you will
    Eliot> confuse people when you use MUST, SHALL, and REQUIRED.

    Eliot> Section 5.3.2, 2nd para, last sentence:

    >> The security parameters SHOULD be checked against the security
    >> requirements of the requested session to make sure that the
    >> resumed session provides proper security.

    Eliot> I think what you are aiming at here is a downgrade attack.
    Eliot> First, isn't this covered in DTLS?  Otherwise, here I would
    Eliot> argue for a MUST, and I would be more clear about what you
    Eliot> are protecting against, such as the following:

    >> In order to avoid downgrade attacks, an exiting session MUST
    >> NOT be reused if its protection does not match the minimum
    >> policy requirements of the new SYSLOG over DTLS session
    >> request.
    Eliot> Editorial:

    Eliot> Same section ABNF: is it not customary to use lower case,
    Eliot> particularly for non-terminals?

    Eliot> Again, thanks to the authors for putting this out there.

    Eliot> Eliot


Why isn't usability sufficient for a MUST in this case?  Here's the
argument.  Unless turning on security is as easy as not doing so, then
there is a sigfificant cost to security and we will not get the
benefits we should.  As a result, especially because there are
significant passive attacks protected against by using DTLS, the
security of the protocol will be significantly improved by requiring
implementations provide a easy-to-enable security solution.

Generating a self-signed cert on a Mac or Linux box is *not* easy compared to running syslogd.

Sam, with his painless-security.com hat on.
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