[TLS] Re: WG Last Call: draft-ietf-tls-mlkem-08 (Ends 20 26-07-08)

Stephen Farrell <[email protected]> Sun, 12 Jul 2026 13:55:27 +0100
Newsgroups gmane.ietf.tls
Message-ID <[email protected]>
WRT generic use of RNGs in IETF protocols:

On 12/07/2026 09:06, John Mattsson wrote:
> I think this discussion would be better held in a broader IETF
> context rather than within individual TLS KEM drafts. The best
> outcome would be for an IETF working group to produce an RFC4086bis
> that other RFCs could reference. Such an update should point
> implementers to existing standards, such as relevant NIST
> publications, and widely deployed implementations such as Linux /dev/
> random.
> 
> RFC 4086 is a good document on the principles of randomness, but it
> is no longer a good implementation manual for someone writing a TLS
> stack in 2026. I also do not think the NIST specifications are
> perfectly suitable. They are focused on cryptographic modules and do
> not ephasize essential principles such as combining multiple entropy
> sources and continuously incorporating fresh entropy into the RNG
> state.

The above seems sensible. IIRC 4086 was AD sponsored, which'd have
been my initial take on how to process a successor, but it's quite
arguable that a WG could be better now, esp since we have new fancy
crypto here and there (e.g. ppm) where some new issues might arise.
A WG is probably more likely to result in such issues being thought
through.

I don't think having such a WG means we ought not add text to e.g.
the ml-kem drafts. While lots of duplication is bad, a little bit
of duplication can be just right:-)

Cheers,
S.

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