[TLS] Re: WG Last Call: draft-ietf-tls-mlkem-08 (Ends 20 26-07-08)
Stephen Farrell <[email protected]> Sun, 12 Jul 2026 13:55:27 +0100
| Newsgroups | gmane.ietf.tls |
|---|---|
| Message-ID | <[email protected]> |
WRT generic use of RNGs in IETF protocols: On 12/07/2026 09:06, John Mattsson wrote: > I think this discussion would be better held in a broader IETF > context rather than within individual TLS KEM drafts. The best > outcome would be for an IETF working group to produce an RFC4086bis > that other RFCs could reference. Such an update should point > implementers to existing standards, such as relevant NIST > publications, and widely deployed implementations such as Linux /dev/ > random. > > RFC 4086 is a good document on the principles of randomness, but it > is no longer a good implementation manual for someone writing a TLS > stack in 2026. I also do not think the NIST specifications are > perfectly suitable. They are focused on cryptographic modules and do > not ephasize essential principles such as combining multiple entropy > sources and continuously incorporating fresh entropy into the RNG > state. The above seems sensible. IIRC 4086 was AD sponsored, which'd have been my initial take on how to process a successor, but it's quite arguable that a WG could be better now, esp since we have new fancy crypto here and there (e.g. ppm) where some new issues might arise. A WG is probably more likely to result in such issues being thought through. I don't think having such a WG means we ought not add text to e.g. the ml-kem drafts. While lots of duplication is bad, a little bit of duplication can be just right:-) Cheers, S. _______________________________________________ TLS mailing list -- [email protected] To unsubscribe send an email to [email protected]
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