[TLS] Re: Fwd: New Version Notification for draft-yusef-tl s-pqt-dual-certs-02.txt

Rifaat Shekh-Yusef <[email protected]> Wed, 15 Jul 2026 13:19:39 -0400
Newsgroups gmane.ietf.tls
Message-ID <CADNypP-jnqs88qp1tRTv7JOoGj2x3JDFP2PLtmTvx2rMFEdS9g@mail.gmail.com>
Hi Erwin,

You seem to be referring to the following draft:
https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-reddy-pquip-pqc-signature-migration-01.html

This thread is specifically about the Dual certificates draft.
I suggest that you start a separate thread on this topic with the
proper subject.

Regards,
 Rifaat


On Wed, Jul 15, 2026 at 1:01 PM Erwin Hoffmann <[email protected]> wrote:

> Hi Rifaat,
>
> given the title "Guidance for Migration to Composite, Dual, or PQC
> Authentication" I guess we can not neglect the 'operational' impact of
> that choice.
>
> IMHO, it is not enough to define and provide some data structures,
> rather we should care about how to use those in an existing world with
> a heterogeneous infrastructure; among TPMs are one part.
>
> A few years ago, it was my duty to extend the 'libdkim' with ECC
> signatures [1], [2]. This involved three steps:
>
> a) To generate ECC DKIM signatures  (and advertise them im the email
> header - you can verify this by looking at this mail) in a hybrid mode.
> b) A parser, able to verify RSA and ECC DKIM signatures.
> c) To provide users with the capability to offer the DKIM public keys
> in the DNS (given my 'Bernstein SW' related 'universe').
>
> Thus, my argumentation is: In order to give a valid guidance, one has
> to consider generation, transport, and usage of those certificates.
> I would call this a 360 degree view.
>
> It would be helpful if the draft can be extended to meet those
> requirements. Unfortunately, the last step seems to be quite research
> intensive to me and probably will never be 100% close to what is
> expected.
>
> Rather, if not in-scope, the introduction of your draft should at least
> mention that obstacle. Also, some kind of operational picture -
> providing insight into the different domains given the different data
> structures - would certainly help.
>
> On the long run, the (qualified) operational use of hybrid certificates
> could be addressed in a different document.
>
> Regards.
> --eh.
>
> [1] https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8463
> [2] https://www.fehcom.de/pub/DKIM.pdf
>
>
> Am Mittwoch, dem 15.07.2026 um 12:13 -0400 schrieb Rifaat Shekh-Yusef:
> > Hi Erwin,
> >
> > TPMs are out of scope for this document, because this deals with what
> > goes "on the wire".
> >
> > Can you elaborate on what you have in mind about TPMs in this case?
>
> --
> Dr. Erwin Hoffmann | www.fehcom.de
> PGP key-id: 36553F7F9C58D1CC
> PGP key-fingerprint:  950B 5555 0B08 5A2A 1C00 9594 3655 3F7F 9C58 D1CC
>

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