[TLS] Re: MLKEM Consensus Call (was WG Last Call: draft- ietf-tls-mlkem-08 (Ends 2026-07-08))

I can live with the proposed changes, although I would like to point out
that 2) is essentially just saying "If you don't follow this standard as
specified, it might break". We could equally warn about the fact that
use-after-free can result in remote code execution vulnerabilities or
similar. But as I said, the proposed text (in Quynh's variant) is not
wrong, and if it helps calm down the mood a bit, I'm all for it.

On Mon, Jul 20, 2026 at 6:37 AM John Mattsson <john.mattsson=
[email protected]> wrote:

> Thanks Joe,
>
> As with most industry, I would like to see this standardized and supported
> by libraries so that I can potentially enable it in the future. European
> cybersecurity agencies such as ANSSI has a high confidence in ML-KEM [1].
>
> The value of hybridization with quantum-vulnerable cryptography is clearly
> temporary, especially if one believes that nation-state attackers will have
> CRQCs in 2029 [2].
>
> The campaign by Bernstein et al. against the IETF and ML-KEM is a waste of
> everybody's time and resources and is likely to have a significant negative
> impact on cybersecurity. Can the IETF please take action before we lose
> more brilliant researchers, such as Nadim Kobeissi, from the community? [3]
>
> Cheers,
> John Preuß Mattsson
>
> [1]
> https://na.eventscloud.com/file_uploads/b635298de1c10be6d3732863e8b1beca_Day2-1600-ANSSI.pdf
>
> [2] https://cr.yp.to/talks/2023.06.15/slides-djb-20230615-pqrisk-4x3.pdf
>
> [3] https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/7HNihlgf0I8Mpe-0nqGb56dnON8/
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-- 

Sophie Schmieg | Information Security Engineer | ISE Crypto |
[email protected]

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