[TLS] Re: MLKEM Consensus Call (was WG Last Call: draft- ietf-tls-mlkem-08 (Ends 2026-07-08))
"Christian Veenman \(NCSC-NL\)" <[email protected]> Mon, 20 Jul 2026 14:14:08 +0200
| Newsgroups | gmane.ietf.tls |
|---|---|
| Message-ID | <[email protected]> |
Hi John, Just a small correction: The slides of ANSI say "higher confidence" rather than "high confidence" when talking about ML-KEM which feels a bit different to me since "higher" seems to imply that it's relative to something else. Only FN-DSA seems to be classified as "high confidence" in the slides. Just wanted to point that out for clarity. The reference you provided is appreciated though! ~ Christian Veenman (NCSC-NL) Ps. I have been lurking this list since April and this is my first time replying. I am still discovering a bit how everything works over here. Please let me know if I do not follow proper etiquette. On 7/20/2026 6:36 AM, John Mattsson wrote: > > > Caution: This mail has been sent from an external source outside of > NCSC. Do not reply to it, or open any links/attachments unless you are > sure of the sender's identity. > > > Thanks Joe, > > As with most industry, I would like to see this standardized and > supported by libraries so that I can potentially enable it in the > future. European cybersecurity agencies such as ANSSI has a high > confidence in ML-KEM [1]. > > The value of hybridization with quantum-vulnerable cryptography is > clearly temporary, especially if one believes that nation-state > attackers will have CRQCs in 2029 [2]. > > The campaign by Bernstein et al. against the IETF and ML-KEM is a > waste of everybody's time and resources and is likely to have a > significant negative impact on cybersecurity. Can the IETF please take > action before we lose more brilliant researchers, such as Nadim > Kobeissi, from the community? [3] > > Cheers, > John Preuß Mattsson > > [1] > https://na.eventscloud.com/file_uploads/b635298de1c10be6d3732863e8b1beca_Day2-1600-ANSSI.pdf > > [2] https://cr.yp.to/talks/2023.06.15/slides-djb-20230615-pqrisk-4x3.pdf > > [3] https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/7HNihlgf0I8Mpe-0nqGb56dnON8/ > > _______________________________________________ > TLS mailing list [email protected] > To unsubscribe send an email [email protected] _______________________________________________ TLS mailing list -- [email protected] To unsubscribe send an email to [email protected]