[TLS] Re: Last Call: <draft-ietf-tls-mlkem-09.txt> (ML-KEM Post-Quantum Key Agreement for TLS 1.3) to Informat ional RFC
Christian Huitema <[email protected]>
| Newsgroups | gmane.ietf.tls |
|---|---|
| Message-ID | <[email protected]> |
On 8/11/2026 9:18 AM, Nadim Kobeissi wrote: > Hi DJB, > > Sorry, let me try to be more constructive. > > I really think that the way you’re communicating your concerns is > simply impossible to digest by most of us. I think deployments now have the choice between "hybrid" and "solo" deployments of PQ algorithms. There will be reference documents for both. The IETF has expressed a clear preference for hybrids through the "preference" flag, and also by pushing the hybrid specification on the standard track and the solo specification as an informational document. I understand the concern that this may be too subtle, and that many would prefer a more forceful way to steer deployments away from the solo option. On the other hand, I don't think that belaboring the point in e-mail to the TLS working group would achieve that goal of "steering deployments away from solo PQ". If Dan and others do think that there are good arguments to steer deployments away from solo PQ, then by all means publish these arguments. Nadim suggests using web site or scientific publication, so as to obtain a permanent reference. Another possibility would be to prepare an RFC explaining the issues with solo PQ. As stated in its web site (https://www.rfc-editor.org/authors/rfc-independent-submissions/), the Independent Stream covers a number of classes of submissions, including discussions of technologies, ... and critiques of the IETF process, so I think that would be an appropriate venue. There are also examples of such documents in the IETF stream like RFC 8900 (IP Fragmentation Considered Fragile), or in the IAB stream like RFC 4840 (Multiple Encapsulation Methods Considered Harmful), but doing that will require consensus within a working group or within the IAB, which may delay the publication for some time. -- Christian Huitema _______________________________________________ TLS mailing list -- [email protected] To unsubscribe send an email to [email protected]