[TLS] Fwd: New Version Notification for draft-reddy-tls-comp osite-mldsa-11.txt

Hi all,

We have published a revised version of the draft:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-reddy-tls-composite-mldsa. This
revision incorporates the feedback received from the WG. The main changes
include adding the missing composite algorithm based on the selection
criteria in the draft, clarifying why the loss of SUF-CMA security does not
impact TLS authentication, and adding downgrade security considerations.

Please take a look and let us know if there are any further comments or
issues.

Thanks,
-Tiru
---------- Forwarded message ---------
From: <[email protected]>
Date: Tue, 18 Aug 2026 at 18:19
Subject: New Version Notification for draft-reddy-tls-composite-mldsa-11.txt
To: Tirumaleswar Reddy.K <[email protected]>, Daniel Van Geest <
[email protected]>, John Gray <[email protected]>,
Scott Fluhrer <[email protected]>, Timothy Hollebeek <
[email protected]>


A new version of Internet-Draft draft-reddy-tls-composite-mldsa-11.txt has
been successfully submitted by Tirumaleswar Reddy and posted to the
IETF repository.

Name:     draft-reddy-tls-composite-mldsa
Revision: 11
Title:    Use of Composite ML-DSA in TLS 1.3
Date:     2026-08-18
Group:    Individual Submission
Pages:    16
URL:
https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-reddy-tls-composite-mldsa-11.txt
Status:   https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-reddy-tls-composite-mldsa/
HTML:
https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-reddy-tls-composite-mldsa-11.html
HTMLized:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-reddy-tls-composite-mldsa
Diff:
https://author-tools.ietf.org/iddiff?url2=draft-reddy-tls-composite-mldsa-11

Abstract:

   Compositing the post-quantum ML-DSA signature with traditional
   signature algorithms provides protection against potential breaks or
   critical bugs in ML-DSA or the ML-DSA implementation.  This document
   specifies how such a composite signature can be formed using ML-DSA
   with RSA-PKCS#1 v1.5, RSA-PSS, ECDSA, Ed25519, and Ed448 to provide
   authentication in TLS 1.3, including use in certificates.



The IETF Secretariat

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