[media-types] [IANA #1429587] application/vnd.vuq regi stration request
"Amanda Baber via RT" <[email protected]>
| Newsgroups | gmane.ietf.types |
|---|---|
| Message-ID | <[email protected]> |
Hi Alexey, A sec cons note from the requester: "To remove any ambiguity, I’d like to retract the phrase '(Bitcoin-equivalent strength)' from my registration request. On reflection, that wording is marketing-ish and potentially misleading. The intent was only to state that the format uses SHA-256 for hash chaining to provide tamper detection. Everything else in the Security Considerations stands as submitted." thanks, Amanda On Mon Sep 15 23:44:53 2025, amanda.baber wrote: > Hi Alexey, > > Can you review this one for us by September 29th? > > thanks, > Amanda > > ===== > > Name: Phillip Danial Gimmi > > Email: [email protected] > > Media type name: application > > Media subtype name: vnd.vuq > > Required parameters: N/A > > Optional parameters: N/A > > Encoding considerations: binary > > The format is a binary container; NUL bytes may appear; CR/LF may > appear outside CRLF; individual chunks can exceed 998 octets. > Therefore “binary” is correct > > Security considerations: This media type contains active content > (WebAssembly modules and JavaScript) executed within a constrained > runtime. Security measures include: > > (1) ACTIVE CONTENT: All executable content runs in a WebAssembly > sandbox with memory isolation and restricted system call access. > JavaScript execution is limited to approved APIs with no direct DOM or > file system access. > > (2) CRYPTOGRAPHIC INTEGRITY: The format uses SHA-256 hash chains > (Bitcoin-equivalent strength) for tamper detection and AES-256-GCM for > content encryption. Digital signatures use Ed25519 for authenticity > verification. > > (3) MALICIOUS CONTENT PREVENTION: Input validation prevents buffer > overflows, path traversal attacks, and ZIP bombs. Resource limits > include maximum 512MB memory allocation and 30-second execution > timeouts per operation. > > (4) DATA EXFILTRATION PREVENTION: Network access is denied by default. > When enabled, only explicitly allowlisted domains are accessible with > rate limiting (10 requests/minute). No local file system access is > permitted. > > (5) COMPRESSION SECURITY: ZSTD compression includes bounds checking > and metadata validation before decompression to prevent resource > exhaustion attacks. > > (6) SIDE-CHANNEL MITIGATION: Cryptographic operations use constant- > time algorithms to prevent timing attacks. Temporary data is securely > cleared from memory. > > Interoperability considerations: (1) ENDIANNESS: All multi-byte > integers use little-endian encoding for cross-platform compatibility. > > (2) VERSION HANDLING: Files include format version in header. > Implementations must reject files with major version numbers higher > than supported. Minor version differences should be handled > gracefully. > > (3) CHUNK PROCESSING: Unknown optional chunks should be ignored. > Unknown mandatory chunks must cause processing to fail with clear > error messages. > > (4) HASH COMPUTATION: SHA-256 operations must use canonical byte > ordering and standard padding as defined in FIPS 180-4. > > (5) POLICY DEFAULTS: Network access defaults to disabled. Copy > protection defaults to tracking-enabled. Implementations should > document any deviations from these defaults. > > (6) MAGIC NUMBER: Implementations must verify the 8-byte magic number > (56 55 51 01 00 00 00 56) before processing to prevent > misidentification. > > Published specification: Basic format specification available at: > https://github.com/PhillipGimmi/vuq > Full technical documentation will be published upon format > stabilization. > > Applications which use this media: Used by the VUQ toolchain and > runtimes to package, distribute, and render responsive, sandboxed > “walled-garden” documents and apps. Typical producers/consumers: > > VUQ Creator/Packager (builds .vuq containers) > > VUQ Viewer (browser/WebAssembly and/or native helper runtime) > > Enterprise Admin/Dashboard (policy and audit tools) > > Third-party software treats this type as an opaque binary container > unless integrated with the VUQ runtime. > > Fragment identifier considerations: None. This media type does not > define fragment identifier semantics; processors MUST NOT assign > meaning to URI fragments for this type. > > Restrictions on usage: None. Suitable for transfer over general > Internet protocols. When used in 7-bit transports (e.g., some email > paths), binary-safe transfer encodings (e.g., Base64) SHOULD be > applied. > > Provisional registration? (standards tree only): No > > Additional information: > > 1. Deprecated alias names for this type: None. > 2. Magic number(s): "VUQ" (0x56,0x55,0x51) + format version (0x01) + > reserved (0x00,0x00,0x00) + verification (0x56) > 3. File extension(s): .vuq > 4. Macintosh file type code: None. > 5. Object Identifiers: None. > > General Comments: This media type may contain active content. > Decoders/viewers MUST execute in a least-privilege sandbox, verify > integrity before processing, deny network access by default (with > optional explicit allow-listing), validate container metadata (to > mitigate decompression bombs and oversized allocations), and prevent > path traversal on any extracted virtual resources. > > Person to contact for further information: > > 1. Name: Phillip Gimmi > 2. Email: [email protected] > > Intended usage: LIMITED USE > > Intended primarily for use by VUQ creator/viewer software and > enterprise systems; not designed as a general-purpose interchange > format among arbitrary applications. > > Author/Change controller: Phillip Gimmi (vendor/owner of the media > type) _______________________________________________ media-types mailing list -- [email protected] To unsubscribe send an email to [email protected]