[media-types] Re: [IANA #1429587] application/vnd.vu q registration request

Alexey Melnikov <[email protected]>
Newsgroups gmane.ietf.types
Message-ID <[email protected]>
Hi Amanda,

On 16/09/2025 18:13, Amanda Baber via RT wrote:
> Hi Alexey,
>
> A sec cons note from the requester:
>
> "To remove any ambiguity, I’d like to retract the phrase '(Bitcoin-equivalent strength)' from my registration request. On reflection, that wording is marketing-ish and potentially misleading. The intent was only to state that the format uses SHA-256 for hash chaining to provide tamper detection. Everything else in the Security Considerations stands as submitted."

Sounds reasonable to me.

One small comment on the registration below:

> thanks,
> Amanda
>
> On Mon Sep 15 23:44:53 2025, amanda.baber wrote:
>> Hi Alexey,
>>
>> Can you review this one for us by September 29th?
>>
>> thanks,
>> Amanda
>>
>> =====
>>
>> Name: Phillip Danial Gimmi
>>
>> Email: [email protected]
>>
>> Media type name: application
>>
>> Media subtype name: vnd.vuq
>>
>> Required parameters: N/A
>>
>> Optional parameters: N/A
>>
>> Encoding considerations: binary
>>
>> The format is a binary container; NUL bytes may appear; CR/LF may
>> appear outside CRLF; individual chunks can exceed 998 octets.
>> Therefore “binary” is correct
>>
>> Security considerations: This media type contains active content
>> (WebAssembly modules and JavaScript) executed within a constrained
>> runtime. Security measures include:
>>
>> (1) ACTIVE CONTENT: All executable content runs in a WebAssembly
>> sandbox with memory isolation and restricted system call access.
>> JavaScript execution is limited to approved APIs with no direct DOM or
>> file system access.
>>
>> (2) CRYPTOGRAPHIC INTEGRITY: The format uses SHA-256 hash chains
>> (Bitcoin-equivalent strength) for tamper detection and AES-256-GCM for
>> content encryption. Digital signatures use Ed25519 for authenticity
>> verification.
>>
>> (3) MALICIOUS CONTENT PREVENTION: Input validation prevents buffer
>> overflows, path traversal attacks, and ZIP bombs. Resource limits
>> include maximum 512MB memory allocation and 30-second execution
>> timeouts per operation.
>>
>> (4) DATA EXFILTRATION PREVENTION: Network access is denied by default.
>> When enabled, only explicitly allowlisted domains are accessible with
>> rate limiting (10 requests/minute). No local file system access is
>> permitted.
>>
>> (5) COMPRESSION SECURITY: ZSTD compression includes bounds checking
>> and metadata validation before decompression to prevent resource
>> exhaustion attacks.
>>
>> (6) SIDE-CHANNEL MITIGATION: Cryptographic operations use constant-
>> time algorithms to prevent timing attacks. Temporary data is securely
>> cleared from memory.
>>
>> Interoperability considerations: (1) ENDIANNESS: All multi-byte
>> integers use little-endian encoding for cross-platform compatibility.
>>
>> (2) VERSION HANDLING: Files include format version in header.
>> Implementations must reject files with major version numbers higher
>> than supported. Minor version differences should be handled
>> gracefully.
>>
>> (3) CHUNK PROCESSING: Unknown optional chunks should be ignored.
>> Unknown mandatory chunks must cause processing to fail with clear
>> error messages.
>>
>> (4) HASH COMPUTATION: SHA-256 operations must use canonical byte
>> ordering and standard padding as defined in FIPS 180-4.
>>
>> (5) POLICY DEFAULTS: Network access defaults to disabled. Copy
>> protection defaults to tracking-enabled. Implementations should
>> document any deviations from these defaults.
>>
>> (6) MAGIC NUMBER: Implementations must verify the 8-byte magic number
>> (56 55 51 01 00 00 00 56) before processing to prevent
>> misidentification.
>>
>> Published specification: Basic format specification available at:
>> https://github.com/PhillipGimmi/vuq
>> Full technical documentation will be published upon format
>> stabilization.
>>
>> Applications which use this media: Used by the VUQ toolchain and
>> runtimes to package, distribute, and render responsive, sandboxed
>> “walled-garden” documents and apps. Typical producers/consumers:
>>
>> VUQ Creator/Packager (builds .vuq containers)
>>
>> VUQ Viewer (browser/WebAssembly and/or native helper runtime)
>>
>> Enterprise Admin/Dashboard (policy and audit tools)
>>
>> Third-party software treats this type as an opaque binary container
>> unless integrated with the VUQ runtime.
>>
>> Fragment identifier considerations: None. This media type does not
>> define fragment identifier semantics; processors MUST NOT assign
>> meaning to URI fragments for this type.

I think the MUST NOT requirement can't really be enforced, as it is not 
going to change how browsers (for example), interpret fragments for this 
media type. So I suggest it should be removed. Stating that no fragment 
identifier semantics is defined seems sufficient.

>> Restrictions on usage: None. Suitable for transfer over general
>> Internet protocols. When used in 7-bit transports (e.g., some email
>> paths), binary-safe transfer encodings (e.g., Base64) SHOULD be
>> applied.
>>
>> Provisional registration? (standards tree only): No
>>
>> Additional information:
>>
>> 1. Deprecated alias names for this type: None.
>> 2. Magic number(s): "VUQ" (0x56,0x55,0x51) + format version (0x01) +
>> reserved (0x00,0x00,0x00) + verification (0x56)
>> 3. File extension(s): .vuq
>> 4. Macintosh file type code: None.
>> 5. Object Identifiers: None.
>>
>> General Comments: This media type may contain active content.
>> Decoders/viewers MUST execute in a least-privilege sandbox, verify
>> integrity before processing, deny network access by default (with
>> optional explicit allow-listing), validate container metadata (to
>> mitigate decompression bombs and oversized allocations), and prevent
>> path traversal on any extracted virtual resources.
>>
>> Person to contact for further information:
>>
>> 1. Name: Phillip Gimmi
>> 2. Email: [email protected]
>>
>> Intended usage: LIMITED USE
>>
>> Intended primarily for use by VUQ creator/viewer software and
>> enterprise systems; not designed as a general-purpose interchange
>> format among arbitrary applications.
>>
>> Author/Change controller: Phillip Gimmi (vendor/owner of the media
>> type)

Best Regards,

Alexey

_______________________________________________
media-types mailing list -- [email protected]
To unsubscribe send an email to [email protected]
lmpx.com only provides a reader for public news (NNTP) servers. It is not affiliated with the servers or forums shown here and is not responsible for the content of articles, which is written by their respective authors.