[media-types] Re: [IANA #1449861] text/vnd.longform registration request
"Murray S. Kucherawy" <[email protected]> Tue, 14 Apr 2026 09:03:09 -0700
| Newsgroups | gmane.ietf.types |
|---|---|
| Message-ID | <CAL0qLwYTtFP0mVWHbDLAdZtDHr8Ogm0KwoDtpqZSm8-wg+y+TA@mail.gmail.com> |
On Mon, Apr 13, 2026 at 4:00 PM Amanda Baber via RT < [email protected]> wrote: > He initially submitted this as text/longform, but it isn't associated with > a standards organization, and he didn't think it should be grandfathered. > He writes, "I'm a solo developer and this is all quite new to me. I'm > interested in what feedback I might receive on the media type but can > understand the vendor tree option might be the best until my ideas have > matured and proved out a bit. Can you update to text/vnd.longform for now. > I'll apply that change to the specification at > https://longform.occultist.dev." > For a solo developer, perhaps the "prs" (personal) tree would be more appropriate? The primary distinction between the vendor and personal/vanity trees appears to be that the latter registrations are associated with "products", though RFC 6838 doesn't strictly say they need to be commercial products. So let's say: If the applicant is OK with the personal/vanity tree, this is approved as "text/prs.longform". If he really wants the vendor tree, does he want to argue that there are "products" out there that use this media type? -MSK ===== > > Name: Matthew Quinn > > Email: [email protected] > > Media type name: text > > Media subtype name: vnd.longform > > Required parameters: charset parameter is optional, UTF-8 charset is the > default. > > Optional parameters: N/A > > Encoding considerations: 8bit > > Security considerations: Longform is used like Markdown and has all the > security considerations of the text/markdown media type, however it has a > broader feature set that should be considered. The following is taken from > here: https://longform.occultist.dev/#security-considerations > > Longform is typically rendered into a HTML document, or parsed client side > and rendered into a DOM environment. It is possible to mix untrusted user > defined content with the original Longform markup creating the possibility > of content injection attacks. Longform provides sanitization APIs that can > be configured with allow lists to only allow intended markup to be rendered > at the location the untrusted content is being embedded. Where the markup > is in the Longform form, the Longform parser should apply the sanitization > rules to the markup. Where HTML markup is used the parser should expose > APIs so the sanitization rules can be enforced using the Sanitizer API and > / or the Trusted Types API. These APIs work in a DOM environment on modern > browsers. For server side sanitization or older browser support the parser > would need to integrate with a sanitization library such as DOMPurify. > Users of a Longform parser should familiarize themselves with how to > configure their parser to sanitize HT > ML content correctly in any environment the content is parsed. > There's an errant line break here. > The Longform serialization rules assume the Longform document itself is > not comprised of untrusted content. Parsers should consider exposing APIs > to allow the same sanitization rules be applied document wide so documents > can be constructed from multiple sources before being parsed. > > It is important for parser implementers to consider that any user content > that is rendered into the HTML page as HTML could use the same HTML ids or > data attributes as the ones used by the parser and could be picked up by > the client application instead of the intended Longform fragment. So it is > important that a parsers takes steps to ensure the data attribute names > used are unique, maybe using values generated at the time of render. > Parsers are encouraged to export CSS selector strings that client > applications can use to rebuild the Longform documents, instead of fixed > data-attribute naming conventions. For this reason it is also preferred > that data attributes are used over HTML ids where user content might be > rendered to the page even if the fragment has an embedded id. > > Application developers using Longform in the client should consider the > affects external scripts might have on a Longform fragment if it is > re-attached to the DOM after state changes. Browser extensions could modify > the fragment if it is attached to the DOM so consider performing a deep > clone on a pristine in memory copy of the fragment instead of re-using > previously attached fragments. > > Interoperability considerations: Longform is in development and the final > formal syntax is not yet complete. The base media type is intended to be a > narrow feature set intended for the purposes described in > https://longform.occultist.dev/#fragments. It is intended that the syntax > and directives could be built upon by other formats and considerations are > being made for that now. > > Published specification: https://longform.occultist.dev > > Applications which use this media: Applications that render HTML > documents, handle DOM state changes and maybe also render to XML and MathML. > > Fragment identifier considerations: The fragment identifier is used to > select from the available Longform fragments outputted by parsing a > Longform document. Fragment identifiers are currently loosely described > here https://longform.occultist.dev/#fragments. > > Longform also supports simple templating. A fragment identifier can be > used to apply parameters to a template using the query string format > following the Longform fragment's identifier. > > Restrictions on usage: None. > > Provisional registration? (standards tree only): No > > Additional information: > > 1. Deprecated alias names for this type: None > 2. Magic number(s): None > 3. File extension(s): .lf, .longform > 4. Macintosh file type code: TBD > 5. Object Identifiers: Unsure > > General Comments: > > Person to contact for further information: > > 1. Name: Matthew Quinn > 2. Email: [email protected] > > Intended usage: COMMON > > Author/Change controller: Matthew Quinn, [email protected] > _______________________________________________ media-types mailing list -- [email protected] To unsubscribe send an email to [email protected]