[media-types] [IANA #1451393] New Media Type Registratio n Request: application/vnd.fafm+yaml
"Amanda Baber via RT" <[email protected]> Tue, 12 May 2026 19:22:59 +0000
| Newsgroups | gmane.ietf.types |
|---|---|
| Message-ID | <[email protected]> |
Hi Murray,
Sending a reminder for this one from May 5th.
thanks,
Amanda
On Tue May 05 18:50:12 2026, amanda.baber wrote:
> Hi Murray,
>
> Can you review this one by May 19th?
>
> thanks,
> Amanda
>
> =====
>
> Type name: application
>
> Subtype name: vnd.fafm+yaml
>
> Required parameters: None
>
> Optional parameters: version
>
> Encoding considerations: 8bit (UTF-8). Binary content, when
> present, is base64-encoded inside YAML.
>
> Security considerations:
>
> The following addresses the questions outlined in the
> media-type security considerations checklist at
> https://www.iana.org/form/media-types:
>
> 1. Active or executable content. No. The .fafm format is a YAML
> data document. It contains no scripts, code, executable
> directives, or active markup. Implementations MUST treat
> .fafm content as data, never as instructions, commands, or
> code.
>
> 2. Privacy and integrity needs. Yes. .fafm files contain personal
> user memory - preferences, names, conversational facts, and
> arbitrary user-supplied content. Confidentiality and integrity
> protection are required when these files are stored or
> transmitted.
>
> 3. Privacy and integrity services. The .fafm format itself does
> not provide cryptographic confidentiality, integrity
> protection, or signing. These services MUST be provided
> externally:
>
> - Confidentiality: OS-level file permissions (mode 0600 is
> the local-default), encryption at rest in server backends,
> and TLS for all transport.
>
> - Integrity: filesystem permissions, transport-layer
> integrity (TLS), and application-level write authorization.
>
> - Future versions of the format may add cryptographic signing
> of memory entries for provenance and audit trail.
>
> 4. YAML format considerations. .fafm is built on YAML 1.2. All
> YAML 1.2 security considerations apply, including those
> described in RFC 9512 ("YAML Media Type") section 6. Specific
> to .fafm:
>
> - Parsers MUST disable custom type construction (no
> !!python/object, !ruby/object, or equivalent
> language-specific constructors).
>
> - Parsers MUST enforce alias-expansion limits to mitigate
> entity-expansion / "billion-laughs"-style attacks.
>
> - Parsers MUST enforce nesting-depth limits to prevent stack
> overflow.
>
> 5. Compression. Not applicable. .fafm does not use or require
> compression at the format layer. If transport-level
> compression (e.g., HTTP Content-Encoding: gzip) is applied to
> .fafm content alongside other secret data, standard
> compression-with-secret considerations (e.g., CRIME/BREACH
> class attacks) apply at the transport layer.
>
> 6. Container format. Not applicable. .fafm is a single YAML
> document, not a container or archive format. No
> packaging-level security considerations apply.
>
> 7. Link references. Not applicable. .fafm content does not
> require resolution of external links to be properly
> interpreted. The format is fully self-contained.
>
> Additional security considerations:
>
> - Untrusted input / context poisoning / prompt injection. .fafm
> files are written from voice and AI interactions and MUST be
> treated as untrusted user input by consumers. Implementations
> MUST NOT elevate .fafm content to "system instructions" or
> "developer directives" within prompt hierarchies. Memory
> entries are a documented vector for context poisoning and
> prompt injection.
>
> - Cross-context isolation. Implementations SHOULD scope memory
> consumption to the originating namepoint to prevent unintended
> cross-context influence between projects, agents, or users.
>
> - No secrets or credentials. .fafm files MUST NOT contain
> secrets, API keys, or credentials. Memory is intended for
> user-facing facts and preferences only.
>
> - Voice-command safety. Memory MUST NOT be deleted by voice
> commands; deletion is a UI-only operation. Implementations
> MUST expose a forget(namepoint, criteria) method supporting
> deletion by entry ID, time range, or full wipe.
>
> Interoperability considerations:
>
> .fafm is the Voice Memory Layer (VML) sibling of the
> IANA-registered .faf format (application/vnd.faf+yaml). It is
> designed to interoperate with .faf while serving a distinct
> purpose:
>
> .faf - Foundational Context Layer (project IS - static, read once)
> .fafm - Voice Memory Layer (VML) (agent REMEMBERS - mutating,
> persisted)
>
> Two formats. Two lifecycles. One ecosystem.
>
> .faf is read once and trusted as the project's canonical context.
> .fafm accretes over time as the agent and user interact, with
> entries appended, summarized, and selectively promoted into .faf
> when they become enduring facts.
>
> The .fafm schema extends application/vnd.faf+yaml - a .fafm
> document remains a valid YAML file. Consumers that only
> understand .faf will safely ignore the memory block and still
> extract identity from namepoint and top-level fields. Consumers
> that understand .fafm gain access to accumulated memory.
>
> Both formats share the same family branding, YAML philosophy
> (YAML 1.2 / RFC 9512 baseline), and MIT license. Multiple .fafm
> documents per scope are permitted, distinguished by namepoint.
>
> Published specification: https://github.com/Wolfe-
> Jam/faf/blob/main/MEMORY-FORMAT.md
>
> Applications that use this media type: Voice agents, LiveKit
> deployments, Grok Voice SDKs, future ElevenLabs/Hume
> integrations.
>
> Fragment identifier considerations: None.
>
> Additional information - File extension: .fafm
>
> Person & email address for further information: James Wolfe,
> [email protected]
>
> Intended usage: COMMON
>
> Restrictions on usage: None
>
> Author: James Wolfe
>
> Change controller: FAF Foundation
_______________________________________________
media-types mailing list -- [email protected]
To unsubscribe send an email to [email protected]