[media-types] Re: [IANA #1457050] application/vnd.sa lvanote.sal registration request

Alexey Melnikov <[email protected]>
Newsgroups gmane.ietf.types
Message-ID <[email protected]>
Hi David,

I think this one is fine to register.

Best Regards,

Alexey

On 06/08/2026 19:17, David Dong via RT wrote:
> Hi Alexey,
>
> Following up on this; can you review this new request by August 20th? Please let us know if you need more time.
>
> Thank you.
>
> Best regards,
>
> David Dong
> IANA Services Sr. Specialist
>
> --
>
> Name: Geoff Ellison
>
> Email: [email protected]
>
> Media type name: application
>
> Media subtype name: vnd.salvanote.sal
>
> Required parameters: N/A
>
> Optional parameters: N/A
>
> Encoding considerations: binary
>
>
>
> Security considerations: The content is an opaque AES-256-GCM ciphertext preceded by an 18-octet plaintext header (4-octet magic “SPEP”, 1-octet format version, 1-octet cipher-suite identifier, 12-octet nonce). The format carries no executable or active content, no macros, no external references, and no compression (no decompression-amplification attack class). It contains no plaintext metadata: no filenames, timestamps, identities, or key material. Decryption keys are never present in the file; confidentiality and integrity are provided by AES-256-GCM under keys delivered out of band via a hybrid ML-KEM-1024 + ECDH P-384 key-encapsulation mechanism. The authentication tag is verifiable only by a key holder, so parsers must treat the body as untrusted, unverifiable octets and must not infer integrity from format conformance. Total file length reveals the plaintext length (length − 34 octets); this is a documented, deliberate property. Parsers should reject files with unrecognis
> ed version or suite identifiers rather than attempting interpretation.
>
> Interoperability considerations: Single canonical binary form; no character-set or line-ending variability; byte-identical across platforms. The 6-octet identification header is stable; implementations dispatch on the version and suite octets and hard-fail on unrecognised values (no fallback parsing).
>
> Published specification: https://www.salvanote.com/security/salvanote-sds-encrypted-file-formats/
>
> Applications which use this media: Salvanote SDS (Salvanote Document Safe), a secure document platform; file-identification tools.
>
> Fragment identifier considerations: N/A
>
> Restrictions on usage: none
>
> Provisional registration? (standards tree only): No
>
> Additional information:
>
> 1. Deprecated alias names for this type: none
> 2. Magic number(s): first 4 octets 53 50 45 50 (ASCII “SPEP”) at offset 0; octet 4 is the format version (currently 0x01); octet 5 is the cipher-suite identifier (currently 0x01). Current files therefore begin 53 50 45 50 01 01.
> 3. File extension(s): .sal
> 4. Macintosh file type code: none
> 5. Object Identifiers: none
>
> General Comments:
>
> Person to contact for further information:
>
> 1. Name: Geoff Ellison
> 2. Email: [email protected]
>
> Intended usage: COMMON
>
> encrypted document payloads produced and consumed by Salvanote SDS.
>
> Author/Change controller: Salvanote Pty Ltd
_______________________________________________
media-types mailing list -- [email protected]
To unsubscribe send an email to [email protected]
lmpx.com only provides a reader for public news (NNTP) servers. It is not affiliated with the servers or forums shown here and is not responsible for the content of articles, which is written by their respective authors.