[media-types] Re: [IANA #1457050] application/vnd.sa lvanote.sal registration request
Alexey Melnikov <[email protected]>
| Newsgroups | gmane.ietf.types |
|---|---|
| Message-ID | <[email protected]> |
Hi David, I think this one is fine to register. Best Regards, Alexey On 06/08/2026 19:17, David Dong via RT wrote: > Hi Alexey, > > Following up on this; can you review this new request by August 20th? Please let us know if you need more time. > > Thank you. > > Best regards, > > David Dong > IANA Services Sr. Specialist > > -- > > Name: Geoff Ellison > > Email: [email protected] > > Media type name: application > > Media subtype name: vnd.salvanote.sal > > Required parameters: N/A > > Optional parameters: N/A > > Encoding considerations: binary > > > > Security considerations: The content is an opaque AES-256-GCM ciphertext preceded by an 18-octet plaintext header (4-octet magic “SPEP”, 1-octet format version, 1-octet cipher-suite identifier, 12-octet nonce). The format carries no executable or active content, no macros, no external references, and no compression (no decompression-amplification attack class). It contains no plaintext metadata: no filenames, timestamps, identities, or key material. Decryption keys are never present in the file; confidentiality and integrity are provided by AES-256-GCM under keys delivered out of band via a hybrid ML-KEM-1024 + ECDH P-384 key-encapsulation mechanism. The authentication tag is verifiable only by a key holder, so parsers must treat the body as untrusted, unverifiable octets and must not infer integrity from format conformance. Total file length reveals the plaintext length (length − 34 octets); this is a documented, deliberate property. Parsers should reject files with unrecognis > ed version or suite identifiers rather than attempting interpretation. > > Interoperability considerations: Single canonical binary form; no character-set or line-ending variability; byte-identical across platforms. The 6-octet identification header is stable; implementations dispatch on the version and suite octets and hard-fail on unrecognised values (no fallback parsing). > > Published specification: https://www.salvanote.com/security/salvanote-sds-encrypted-file-formats/ > > Applications which use this media: Salvanote SDS (Salvanote Document Safe), a secure document platform; file-identification tools. > > Fragment identifier considerations: N/A > > Restrictions on usage: none > > Provisional registration? (standards tree only): No > > Additional information: > > 1. Deprecated alias names for this type: none > 2. Magic number(s): first 4 octets 53 50 45 50 (ASCII “SPEP”) at offset 0; octet 4 is the format version (currently 0x01); octet 5 is the cipher-suite identifier (currently 0x01). Current files therefore begin 53 50 45 50 01 01. > 3. File extension(s): .sal > 4. Macintosh file type code: none > 5. Object Identifiers: none > > General Comments: > > Person to contact for further information: > > 1. Name: Geoff Ellison > 2. Email: [email protected] > > Intended usage: COMMON > > encrypted document payloads produced and consumed by Salvanote SDS. > > Author/Change controller: Salvanote Pty Ltd _______________________________________________ media-types mailing list -- [email protected] To unsubscribe send an email to [email protected]