Re: Private key usage period extension

Bonjour,

This extension is heavily used in electronic passports.
ICAO has set it to be mandatory for Root CA and Document Signer
certificates (subscriber certs used to verify data in passports), and
optional for MasterList signers.
See ICAO MRTD 9303 part 12 document (
http://www.icao.int/publications/Documents/9303_p12_cons_en.pdf).
ICAO did a bad job here; this extension already hurt them in the past
(preventing some Roots to issue a fresh CRL), and their "solution" was to
change the Name comparison rule for CRL checking, so that CAs that don't
have the same Name but have the countryName in common are to be considered
the same CAs, except for China. Yes, it's that bad.

This extension was already deprecated in RFC2459.


2016-05-06 11:53 GMT+02:00 Stephen Farrell <[email protected]>:

>
> Hi Erik,
>
> I've a separate question: does anyone use this extension
> or should we put it on a virtual/mental list of stuff to
> be deprecated when/if someone has the energy?
>
> S.
>
> On 06/05/16 09:42, Erik Andersen wrote:
> > X.509 has a specification of the Private key usage period extension
> > (8.2.2.5). This extension is a little confusing. It has notBefore and
> > notAfter specification. However, the text says:
> >
> > The notBefore component indicates the earliest date and time at which the
> > private key could be used for signing. If the notBefore component is not
> > present, then no information is provided as to when the period of valid
> use
> > of the private key commences. The notAfter component indicates the latest
> > date and time at which the private key could be used for signing. If the
> > notAfter component is not present then no information is provided as to
> when
> > the period of valid use of the private key concludes.
> >
> > With a little ill will, this can be read as the private key validation
> > period may extend beyond the validity of the public key. Note 1 adds to
> the
> > confusing, as it says:
> >
> > NOTE 1 - The period of valid use of the private key may be different from
> > the certified validity of the public key as indicated by the certificate
> > validity period. With digital signature keys, the usage period for the
> > signing private key is typically shorter than that for the verifying
> public
> > key.
> >
> > It is the word "typical" that confuses me. It implies it could be
> different.
> >
> > This extension was included in RFC 3280 with a heavy health warning. It
> was
> > omitted from RFC 5280 (except for A.2).
> >
> > In my mind, the validity of the private key should not spread outside the
> > validity period of the certificate.
> >
> > Have I misunderstood something?
>


-- 
Erwann.

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