Re: [Technical Errata Reported] RFC5280 (5802)
[email protected] (Martin Rex)
| Newsgroups | gmane.ietf.x509 |
|---|---|
| Message-ID | <[email protected]> |
Russ Housley <[email protected]> wrote: > At the time that these values were assigned, TLS was primarily a > protocol for WWW security. It has since been used in may other > environments. I do not see how a change to the comment in the > ASN.1 definition will make any real difference, but I do not really > have an objection. > > I suggest that this be marked as "Hold for Document Update" The applicable **STANDARDS** in this area would be rfc5246 (TLSv1.2) and rfc2818 (HTTP over TLS), and both are **SILENT** on EKU. What openssl does is a non-standard, implementation-defined behaviour, and I consider it a particularly bad idea trying to rewrite history by filing this as an errata ! I've also seen a public CA (Entrust) issue a TLS server certificate which asserted id-kp-serverAuth, but was lacking id-kp-clientAuth. I consider such a certificate a stupid clerical error by Entrust. Whether TLS client software is willing to use such a certificate as TLS client certificate, and whether TLS server software is willing to accept such a TLS server certificate as TLS client certificate turns out to be *VERY* implementation-specific. If changing the limited-applicability comment in rfc5280 for id-kp-serverAuth and id-kp-clientAuth at all, then it should also include which **application**standards**, if any, gives any meaning to these EKUs, and where application standards have *NOT* been giving any meaning all the time, the behaviour is implementation-defined at best. -Martin _______________________________________________ pkix mailing list [email protected] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix