Re: [Technical Errata Reported] RFC6960 (6165)
Stefan Santesson <[email protected]>
| Newsgroups | gmane.ietf.x509 |
|---|---|
| Message-ID | <[email protected]> |
I respond to all of these erratas collectivey (which I believe should be consolidated to 1 and not 3 erratas) I think the observation is correct, but I think it is editorial rather than technical. The normative text is that the KeyHash is the hash of the public key. This is in itself clear an unambiguous. The imperfection here is not in the normative text, but in the explanation where the explanation in B.1 is the most accurate and detaild. The other shorter explanations are not wrong, but insufficient compared with B.1 Please also note that a similar definition exist for the "issuerKeyHash" like: issuerKeyHash OCTET STRING, -- Hash of issuer's public key I think this is editorial Stefan Santesson On 2020-05-11, 14:16, "RFC Errata System" <[email protected]> wrote: The following errata report has been submitted for RFC6960, "X.509 Internet Public Key Infrastructure Online Certificate Status Protocol - OCSP". -------------------------------------- You may review the report below and at: https://www.rfc-editor.org/errata/eid6165 -------------------------------------- Type: Technical Reported by: Yury Strozhevsky <[email protected]> Section: 1 Original Text ------------- --- Corrected Text -------------- o Appendix B.1 provides correct KeyHash type processing description. Now SHA-1 hash must be calculated for responder's public key ASN.1 value without tag, length and unused bits. Notes ----- The RFC6960 changes OCSP protocol in part of KeyHash type calculation. In RFC2560 there is the description: KeyHash ::= OCTET STRING -- SHA-1 hash of responder's public key (excluding the tag and length fields) But in Appendix B.1, which is the major OCSP descriptive module, stated: KeyHash ::= OCTET STRING -- SHA-1 hash of responder's public key -- (i.e., the SHA-1 hash of the value of the -- BIT STRING subjectPublicKey [excluding -- the tag, length, and number of unused -- bits] in the responder's certificate) The difference is in what would be under SHA-1 hash. In RFC2560 KeyHash would be calculated for entire BIT STRING value, with "unused bits" byte (first byte in BIT STRING value), but Appendix B.1 in RFC6960 states that SHA-1 hash must be calculated for BIT STRING value without "unused bits". Instructions: ------------- This erratum is currently posted as "Reported". If necessary, please use "Reply All" to discuss whether it should be verified or rejected. When a decision is reached, the verifying party can log in to change the status and edit the report, if necessary. -------------------------------------- RFC6960 (draft-ietf-pkix-rfc2560bis-20) -------------------------------------- Title : X.509 Internet Public Key Infrastructure Online Certificate Status Protocol - OCSP Publication Date : June 2013 Author(s) : S. Santesson, M. Myers, R. Ankney, A. Malpani, S. Galperin, C. Adams Category : PROPOSED STANDARD Source : Public-Key Infrastructure (X.509) Area : Security Stream : IETF Verifying Party : IESG _______________________________________________ pkix mailing list [email protected] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pkix