Re: LL32 Multihoming
Erik Guttman <[email protected]>
| Newsgroups | gmane.ietf.zeroconf |
|---|---|
| Message-ID | <[email protected]> |
WG chair hat on We have rough consensus on this point already. It would be nice if the document was as clear as possible. We should not get derailed by again considering whether the algorithm can be run without independence maintained between instances (interfaces) where it is applied. This has been ruled out. WG chair hat off Philip Nye wrote: >>From: "Stuart Cheshire" <[email protected]> >> >>I wrote that I thought this text was overly simplistic. What precisely >>does "independently" mean? If the algorithm is run independently on each >>interface, does that mean it needs to be aware of the other interfaces, >>or not? independent (adj) free from the influence, control or determination of another or others [Webster's] If an algorithm is run independently, then it is not aware of others running the same algorithm. Since the algorithm prevents assignment of the same address to two different interfaces, a host running the algorithm independently on two interfaces would end up with two distinct addresses. > The only difference between two interfaces on the same host and two > interfaces on different hosts is that in the former case communication MAY > take place internally rather than taking network bandwidth. The algorithm > need only be aware of other interfaces insofar as it may make life difficult > for a host if it has the same LL address on multiple interfaces. This is a situation which is useful to avoid, as Erik Nordmark pointed out. If a host intentionally attempts to configure the same LL address on more than one interface, the host will be vulnerable to an attack whereby a conflict on one attached link will result in a reconfiguration of multiple interfaces. An attacker would prevent link-local configuration not only on the link it is attached to, but also on all links the host was attached to. Example. good====i1 HOST i2======evil The host attempts to configure address A on interfaces i1 and i2. Evil prevents this by responding it owns A. The host must cycle through more and more addresses. The host cannot communicate with good until it can find an address that is not claimed by evil, which will never happen. We did not have to deal with this situation in our security considerations section precisely because we stated that hosts run the address selection algorithm *independently* on each interface. > In this > case, it is probably a good idea to avoid picking an address which is > already selected for another interface. > > If the two interfaces happen to be on the same network then the algorithm > MUST ensure that they get different addresses. > > How about adding the following two paragraphs at the end of section 3.4. > > "In particular ARP packets which appear to claim an address which is > assigned to a specific interface, indicate conflict only if they are > received on that interface and their hardware address is of some other > interface." > > "If a host has two interfaces on the same network, then claiming and > defending on those interfaces must ensure that they end up with different > addresses just as if they were on different hosts." I am OK with this text, but I believe this goes without saying. Erik