Re: Policy under an unchained Theresa May
Peter Fairbrother <zenadsl6186-1HOZaDBbGgxaa/[email protected]> Sun, 10 May 2015 12:10:42 +0100
| Newsgroups | gmane.law.cryptography.uk |
|---|---|
| Message-ID | <[email protected]> |
On 09/05/15 14:58, Peter Mitchell wrote: > “A Conservative government would be giving the security agencies and law > enforcement agencies the powers that they need to ensure they're keeping > up to date as people communicate with communications data. We were > prevented from bringing in that legislation into the last government > because of the coalitions with the Lib Dems and we are determined to > bring that through because we believe that is necessary to maintain the > capabilities of our law enforcement agencies so they can continue to do > the excellent job day in day out of keeping us safe and secure” I don't think "people communicate with communications data"; that aside, I don't get Theresa May either, she already seems madder than Mad Maggie at her maddest. Unchained?? Ouch. Maybe Cameron is keeping his enemies closer .. But will it work? Afaics the Police and/or spooks are telling her: 1] "we are losing access to content because people are using encryption" 2] "we are losing access to comms data because people are using facebook (and perhaps the ECtJ ruling)" and 3] "we need lots of data to datamine for terrorists" - they may be telling the Foreign Secretary as well as Theresa. Back to ISPs storing straight comms data? I suppose it could be worse. Comms data for people communicating via Facebook, online games, etc? Mass "black box" Facebook comms data can't be collected unless the black box decrypts everything, and there is probably too much data there anyway. I don't think it's realistically possible to collect mass Facebook-type data with black boxes, though perhaps targeted data could be collected. However, as targeted Facebook-type comms data could be collected by the ISP, with some sort of "comms data only" warrant or authorisation, I don't think black boxes are a suitable means for collecting targeted FB-type comms data. Even then, something would have to be done about encryption for FB-type comms data collection. Banning encryption, mandatory backdoors? At least this list will be getting busier. But it won't work, and it most certainly isn't going to be cost-effective - the cost of banning TLS would be astronomical. Even if it did work, all it can produce is either targeted data (which can be obtained in other ways, in most cases at lower cost) or mass data, which is useless for catching people. Wrote this for something else, but it seems relevant here: Mass data can help once someone is caught, eg there are tales of supporting evidence found in people's comms data after they were arrested - but it can't catch people in the first place. But datamining for terrorists doesn't work, the baseline problem (aka base rate fallacy) rules it out. http://www.badscience.net/2009/02/datamining-would-be-lovely-if-it-worked/ https://www.schneier.com/essays/archives/2005/03/why_data_mining_wont.html When you look at a population the size of the UK, depending how you look there are either too many potential suspects, so it doesn't help, or too few. almost all of whom are false positives - so you don't actually catch the bad guys. This is especially true of the real bad guys, who try not to be caught, and who don't post their murders on facebook or the like. In the US there are no known cases where datamining of mass interception product or comms data has initially identified someone as a person of interest, who was subsequently investigated as a result of that identification and convicted. All the NSA's vaunted mass data collection? - datamining it has never initially identified a single terrorist. Not one. [There aren't any known cases in the UK either, but as evidence of interception wouldn't be allowed in Court that doesn't say much, so I use the US example instead.] -- Peter Fairbrother