Re: part 2 An Ill Wind
Peter Fairbrother <zenadsl6186-1HOZaDBbGgxaa/[email protected]> Tue, 17 Mar 2020 20:02:10 +0000
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On 17/03/2020 16:39, Wendy M. Grossman wrote: > This is, rather obviously, way out of date now. Indeed. Well done Neil and co! The announced change in policy is good, but I still don't really trust the Government, especially SAGE, to do the right thing. Advisors who have been forced to change their policy often do not implement the new policy whole-heartedly. But here's hoping for the best. At least the news is better than it was :) For reference and completeness, below are part 3, A Coventry Moment and part 4, The Whole of the Moon. I did not plan any more :) but I may write one on exit strategies. Please ignore on the slightest pretext. In any case I apologise for having proselytised on non-crypto matters here, but I couldn't think of anywhere better and thought the message was of mortal importance. These may contain some still-new and still-relevant material. And part 3 is even a little relevant to crypto. Peter Fairbrother ----------------------------------------------- 3- A Coventry Moment 15 March 2020 There is a story that Winston Churchill let Coventry burn under German bombing in order to protect the secret that the Nazi Enigma codes had been broken. He made a hard decision to spend lives now, in order to promote the greater good later. On TV recently we have seen Boris Johnston looking Churchillian, having apparently made a similar sort of decision about the coronavirus epidemic - spending 400,000 [1] British lives now in order to gain some future advantage The problem is that we don't know what that advantage is. It all seems a bit nebulous. And apart from the large death toll, such a massive number of cases means the country will never be completely free of the disease - indeed it might provide a reservoir of low level infections which could mutate to produce novel viruses and turn the present virus into a recurrent seasonal virus, a nightmare outcome. - At the start of the epidemic, when we thought that it would prove impossible to stop the infection, the policy of delay made some sense - spread the peak to decrease maximum hospital load and thereby save lives. That 400,000 or so British people would die was unfortunate, but inevitable. There was nothing we could do about it. But then the Chinese stopped their epidemic, showing that there was no need for 400,000 or a million people to die, and everything changed. Except the policy. - Herd immunity is just what happens if you don't do anything to stop any disease which leaves the patient immune after it has run its course. It is at best a distraction. One other possible line of Government thinking is that after we implement strong containment we would then have a still-vulnerable population, giving rise to the fear that we might have to continue strict measures indefinitely. Possible, but what measures? Strict universal isolation is almost certainly not necessary once the disease is under control, though close attention to detail will still be necessary. Proper control of entry to the country with quarantine where appropriate is the major continuing need; but other countries will be doing something similar, and international travel will not be easy for years anyway. Better social distancing - the elbow or foot tap, enlarging personal space, avoiding contact where possible; protective measures like handwashing and handrubs, masks and respirators, perhaps gloves and goggles; widespread testing and diligent contact tracing once the epidemic is under control (with short-term but mandatory isolation/quarantine for those testing positive) are probably all that is needed. But we can follow the Chinese example as they relax controls, and limit measures here to those which are necessary and which work. Medium term, if people get "isolation fatigue", and the disease spreads? We would still be better off if we implement strict confinement now. We would have had time to make a billion masks, time to prepare a hundred million tests, time to open hospital beds, time to get the needed equipment, time to work out optimal therapies - and most of all time to research the disease. For instance, how much would closing schools help? To answer that we need to know whether and to what extent children get the disease in a very mild form and pass it on, or do they just not get it at all - and we do not know the answer to that question. How long does the virus stay active on various surfaces? We don't know. What are the most important secondary and minor routes of infection? We don't know. Why are older people more likely to die, and can anything be done to prevent this? We don't know. How do we immunise the population? We don't know (yet). How can we cure the disease? We don't know. But we do know how to stop it. - Mr Johnston is not Winston Churchill. Churchill himself never faced a "Coventry Dilemma"; that was just one of many similar teaching stories used at Bletchley Park to emphasise the need for secrecy. It wasn't real [2]. Many hard life-and-death balancing decisions were made by Churchill during the war, but the "Coventry Dilemma" was not one of them. As for COVID-19, there is no sacrifice here to be made for the greater good. There is no greater good to be had. Any sacrifice of lives would just be an unconscionable waste, somewhere between manslaughter with reckless disregard for life and pointless mass murder. We can kill the disease. We do not need to kill the population, or 400,000 or a million of it. The Chinese have effectively killed the disease in China. Pretty soon they will be thinking about quarantining people entering the country, if they aren't already. That is the kind of turnaround we should be trying for. As an aside, the real hard decision would not have been to focus efforts on amelioration at the cost of many lives, for some greater eventual good; but instead to implement strong confinement on ethical grounds, even if we thought it couldn't work. Strong containment can work. It has been tried. It worked. There is no obvious downside to doing it. There is no hard decision to make. There is no Coventry Moment. There never was. Peter Fairbrother [1] or a million deaths in real numbers, or twice as many British people as died in WW2. Best to treat the 400,000 Government figure like a contract price estimate which will inevitably overrun. [2] It became a meme after a self-aggrandising idiot called Frank Winterbottom with an ego bigger than Julian Assange reinvented the story with himself in a leading role, and wrote a book including it as a true story. -------------------------------------- 4- The Whole of the Moon 17 March 2020 The good news: the worst-hit (or first hit) countries are now stopping their coronavirus epidemics. China has done pretty much stopped their epidemic spreading [1], in South Korea it is dying out [2], in Iran [3] and perhaps Italy [4] it is getting less of a hold, though it is a bit early to say in Italy's case. How can we be sure of that? Simple. The daily numbers of new cases are falling in all those countries, reaching very low levels in China and South Korea. They have all implemented strong isolation, and it is working for them. In none of them have even one thousandth of the population become, or are likely to become, infected (though Italy may come close). There is no known case where strong isolation is failing to stop the infection. China and South Korea are considering restrictions on people entering their countries in order to prevent infected people bringing the disease in, as that is now their major source of new infections. The bad news: the UK's present policy is still to delay the epidemic rather than try to stop it, allowing over 60% of the population to catch the disease at a projected cost of 400,000 UK deaths (UK Government figures). - So why does the UK government still insist strong isolation will not work for us? It doesn't have to be very onerous. Something like this: from Friday schools close, as do universities, pubs, public gatherings. Most people stay at home for perhaps 4 weeks. During that four weeks we make a lot of masks, respirators and other protective gear. We prepare a very large number of tests. We prepare ventilators and people to operate them, and hospital and hospital beds in case the confinement does not work, though it should. We plan. We research the virus. During the fourth week we test anyone who might have the virus. It is estimated that there are a few tens of thousands of active virus cases now, at the end of the four weeks that should be around five thousand, many of whom will be in hospital and most of the rest will be isolated. After the first isolation period we implement mandatory testing if a doctor or trained nurse or a policy requires it, and mandatory quarantine if infected people do not self-isolate. We limit personal contact, wear masks, wash hands, bump elbows, supply handrub. We monitor all suspected infections and contacts. Schools stay closed until we know more about the effects of closing schools, but people mostly go back to work. Until we find a vaccine or cure or the disease dies out, we implement long-term restrictions on entry to the country - perhaps five days quarantine, with a test on the fifth day. That will not catch everybody, but it will probably catch enough people. I suggest UK people already abroad should not have to pay for this, but for UK people leaving then re-entering and foreigners the cost should be included in the ticket price, a bit like airport taxes. That will not be enough to stop the virus completely, but it will be a good start. We will by then have a better idea of which measures are necessary and which are not. Perhaps one or two thousand people will die. We may have to repeat this, or bring in other measures - but like China, South Korea, Iran and Italy, if we persevere we will stop the virus. - But we have to implement strong isolation now - any delay will cost lives. The Government's alternative is to let the virus infect 40 million people or so, just slowing it down a little. On the Government's own figures that will involve four hundred thousand deaths. This delay policy must stop, now. We want to kil the disease, not delay it. - Suppose we try hard to stop the virus and it fails. We will have had time to prepare for the peak, time to build ventilators, time to train staff to use them, time to make masks, time to expand testing, time to provide more hospital beds - time to research the virus, maybe even time to develop a vaccine or cure. But then suppose we try hard and succeed. It seems most other countries will succeed too, and the disease will wither away or remain at a very low level until a vaccine or cure can be found. We know how to do strong isolation for infection prevention, and all the examples in other countries show where it has been tried it is working - we need to do it now. We also need to drop SAGE, the UK Scientific Advisory Committee on Emergencies. Preferably from a great height. [1] Daily New Cases https://www.worldometers.info/coronavirus/country/china/ [2] Daily New Cases https://www.worldometers.info/coronavirus/country/south-korea/ [3] Daily New Cases https://www.worldometers.info/coronavirus/country/iran/ [4] Daily New Cases https://www.worldometers.info/coronavirus/country/italy/ Peter Fairbrother Slogans for today: Don't delay the epidemic, kill it. Don't delay, kill the coronavirus. Kill the epidemic, not the people.