Re: the cold-boot attack

Andreas Engelbert wrote:
> Jacob Appelbaum schrieb:
>> Boyd Waters wrote:
>>> On Feb 22, 2008, at 9:06 AM, Andreas Engelbert wrote:
>>>
>>>> but why not just overwrite the keys in DRAM as
>>>> soon as a shutdown is signaled?
>>> That's good, but any hacker or other computer-forensics person will not
>>> allow the computer to shut down. They'll just pull the plug. Quickly.
>>>
>> Actually. It's likely that they're going to just use one of these devices:
>> http://www.wiebetech.com/products/HotPlug.php
> 
>> Good luck stopping that. :-(
> 
> 
> Iknow Iknow, the question is not "are you paranoid?" but "are you
> paranoid enough?" (especially on this list) ;)

No one on this list is paranoid enough as far as any other list members
are concerned. I'm pretty sure of that. ;-)

> 
> - From what I've heard about forensic practise in my country is, that they
> usually ring the door bell and show the suspect the search warrant, wich
> might give him the chance to react when prepared for it.
> 

Great. Thieves don't always knock.

> If you are expecting a SWAT team breaking in while asleep, well then
> good night and good luck anyway.

It was thought that this wasn't the case. It's important that people
understand this threat.

> Still, more elaborate countermeasures
> like intrusion detection and acceleration sensors inside the box might
> do the trick.

Monitoring for low temperatures, intrusion detection, adequate panic
routines in software and a little bit of luck may protect you.

Let the world know when you've got such a system, I'd like to use it
myself. I promise to verify before I trust it. :-)


Regards,
Jacob Appelbaum

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Linux-crypto:  cryptography in and on the Linux system
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