Re: the cold-boot attack - a paper tiger?

Matthias Schniedermeyer <[email protected]>
Newsgroups gmane.linux.cryptography
Message-ID <[email protected]>
On 01.06.2008 07:44, Phil wrote:
> 
> > Other parts of losetup (and mount) always properly
> > sanitize key material,
> > excluding 'kill -9' type events.
> 
> 2. I was under the impression SIGKILL couldn't be
> trapped or ignored in C.  How then does loop-aes catch
> a kill -9 and sanitize keys in memory before exiting?

He said that losetup/mount can't defend against 'kill -9' as they are 
"just" userspace-programs. Loop-AES is kernel-mode, so it's a whole 
other story.

And btw. That whole thing has nothing to do with using "C" or any other 
programming language, in the end everything is machine-language anyway.




Bis denn

-- 
Real Programmers consider "what you see is what you get" to be just as 
bad a concept in Text Editors as it is in women. No, the Real Programmer
wants a "you asked for it, you got it" text editor -- complicated, 
cryptic, powerful, unforgiving, dangerous.


-
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