Re: the cold-boot attack - a paper tiger?

* [email protected] wrote:

> [his ideas]

;-)


Well, here's how I adapted my setup:

Booting is solely allowed from HDD. Any keys reside on an external
medium. And I set up the maximum amount of loop devices - the ones I
need and the rest with random keys, some using AES, some Serpent,
some twofish, 128bit, some ... you get the idea.

Also, in the near future I will switch from AES to Serpent. Its
considered to be stronger than AES. Also its key schedule is more
complex and thus reconstructing a key from it is more work for the
attacker.

It does NOT help much against the cold-boot attack, it merely slows
the attacker down. All you can really do, IMHO, at the moment - let's
not jump at shadows.


And BTW, yeah, I also like to see that piece of code the authors of
the paper used to reconstruct a working key from a key schedule.

-- 
left blank, right bald

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