Re: Embedding keys and vulnerabilities

markus reichelt <[email protected]> Wed, 22 Oct 2008 14:12:57 +0200
Newsgroups gmane.linux.cryptography
Organization still stuck in reorganization mode
Message-ID <[email protected]>
* Phil <[email protected]> wrote:

> So, my question is this: could an attacker looking at a partition
> encrypted in this way (which appears random), but knowing that at
> so-many bytes from the beginning there might be a loop-aes
> encrypted gpg key which will either have the loop-aes encrypted
> acii plaintext string above or loop-aes encrypted gpg binary
> headers, use this knowledge to crack the first (top) layer of
> encryption?

Well, there is a filesystem of your choice on that partition anyway
and its structure is known. Given that there are only so much
filesystems you can put to use you already have a known plaintext
issue of some sort. Same stuff applies for widely-used binaries,
document formats / headers etc.

In short, nope.

-- 
left blank, right bald
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