Re: Embedding keys and vulnerabilities
markus reichelt <[email protected]> Wed, 22 Oct 2008 14:12:57 +0200
| Newsgroups | gmane.linux.cryptography |
|---|---|
| Organization | still stuck in reorganization mode |
| Message-ID | <[email protected]> |
* Phil <[email protected]> wrote: > So, my question is this: could an attacker looking at a partition > encrypted in this way (which appears random), but knowing that at > so-many bytes from the beginning there might be a loop-aes > encrypted gpg key which will either have the loop-aes encrypted > acii plaintext string above or loop-aes encrypted gpg binary > headers, use this knowledge to crack the first (top) layer of > encryption? Well, there is a filesystem of your choice on that partition anyway and its structure is known. Given that there are only so much filesystems you can put to use you already have a known plaintext issue of some sort. Same stuff applies for widely-used binaries, document formats / headers etc. In short, nope. -- left blank, right bald
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