Re: xz backdoor
Alexandre Detiste <[email protected]> Sun, 31 Mar 2024 12:13:30 +0200
| Newsgroups | gmane.linux.debian.devel.games,gmane.linux.debian.devel.general |
|---|---|
| Message-ID | <CADsTwjLPbYLvWCHcL1ACwSx_NNApuKT6vjPAAdKq-sgXYgViug@mail.gmail.com> |
Le dim. 31 mars 2024 à 10:17, Sirius <[email protected]> a écrit : > Reduction of complexity is IMHO always worthwhile as it would open the > door for more people being able to step up as maintainers (taking into > account that volunteers right this minute might not be overly welcome and > when they are, they should likely not be near authentication, crypto and > compression at least initially). It's worse than that: to make the xz MR looks more legit; the fake puppet profile "Hans Jansen" also sent _maybe_ legit MR to random games repos: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=39868390 Here fixing our Salsa tooling could help also making real newcomers life more enjoyable by always disabling MR again upstream & pristine-tar tar. I don't see any real good purpose for these unreviewable [*] huge diff; one could just ping someone with commit access to do "gbp import-orig --uscan --pristine-tar ; gbp push" or if absolutely nobody has the time for this maybe a bot could do it ? BTW it's quite smart to attack Games team: as we're used to get legit one-off MR from people never to be seen again later. [*] https://salsa.debian.org/games-team/endless-sky/-/merge_requests/5 Greetings