Re: Reaction to potential PGP schism

Christoph Biedl <[email protected]> Thu, 21 Dec 2023 09:13:16 +0100

Newsgroups	gmane.linux.debian.devel.security,gmane.linux.debian.devel.general
Message-ID	<[email protected]>

Daniel Kahn Gillmor wrote...

(...)

Thanks for your exhaustive description. I'd just like to point out one
point:

> In practice, i think it makes the most sense to engage with
> well-documented, community-reviewed, interoperably-tested standards, and
> the implementations that try to follow them.  From my vantage point,
> that looks like the OpenPGP projects that have continued to actively
> engage in the IETF process, and have put in work to improve their
> interoperability on the most sophisticated suite of OpenPGP tests that
> we have (https://tests.sequoia-pgp.org/, maintained by the Sequoia
> project for the community's benefit).  Projects that work in that way
> are also likely to benefit from smoother upgrades to upcoming work in
> the IETF like post-quantum cryptographic schemes:
>
>     https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-wussler-openpgp-pqc/

There was a presentation at the recent MiniDebconf in Cambridge about
post-quantum cryptography, including the consequences for Debian (that
was by Andy Simpkins):

    https://wiki.debian.org/DebianEvents/gb/2023/MiniDebConfCambridge/Simpkins

The key point AIUI is Debian must take precautions *very* *soon* as
there's a realistic chance QC will - within the lifetime of trixie -
evolve to a point where it seriously weakens the cryptographic security
as we know it. In other words, Debian must prepare for PQC within the
trixie development cycle, so within 2024.

Therefore, my answer to "How can Debian deal with this [schism]?" is
basically: Debian needs to change things in that area anyway, let's
first find an implementation that provides what we need and has a sane
implementation. If that means turning away from GnuPG, so be it. The
transition will be painful anyway.

    Christoph

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