Bug#1102603: openssh: CVE-2025-32728
Colin Watson <[email protected]>
| Newsgroups | gmane.linux.debian.devel.ssh |
|---|---|
| Message-ID | <aAjRQbCrIA-NvQMO__10600.5801282421$1745408544$gmane$org@riva.ucam.org> |
On Tue, Apr 15, 2025 at 09:38:21PM +0200, Salvatore Bonaccorso wrote: >On Tue, Apr 15, 2025 at 02:36:09PM +0100, Colin Watson wrote: >> On Thu, Apr 10, 2025 at 10:20:44PM +0200, Salvatore Bonaccorso wrote: >> > The following vulnerability was published for openssh. >> > >> > CVE-2025-32728[0]: >> > | In sshd in OpenSSH before 10.0, the DisableForwarding directive does >> > | not adhere to the documentation stating that it disables X11 and >> > | agent forwarding. >> >> I'd like to upload the attached changes to bookworm-security, as well as to >> bullseye-security for LTS (after the usual changelog finalization). Do >> these debdiffs look good to you? There's a bit of noise due to git deciding >> to serialize some patches slightly differently, but the added patch is the >> only effective change in both cases. > >We initially marked it as no-dsa for bookworm and so the fix could go >to the next point release. But given you are suggesting a DSA, maybe >we might have missed something important here? Can you elaborate where >we might have overseen something makeing it warrant a DSA? > >What I do understand is that the sshd side envforcing is so not doing >as documented, and AllowAgentForwarding is by default on yes, where >X11Forwarding is changed to default to yes in Debian. >So we have in any case a slight difference here in Debian vs. >upstream. ForwardAgent client side is disabled by default. > >And this has been broken for afaiu so many years that batching the >update in the next point release seemed initially sufficient? No, that's fine, I hadn't noticed that you'd marked it as no-dsa. I'll file a stable update bug for it. Thanks,