Re: [PATCH] btrfs: use mount idmap for defrag permission check
Qu Wenruo <[email protected]>
| Newsgroups | gmane.linux.kernel,gmane.comp.file-systems.btrfs,gmane.linux.file-systems |
|---|---|
| Message-ID | <[email protected]> |
在 2026/8/14 02:41, Seth Forshee 写道: > On Thu, Aug 13, 2026 at 04:04:05PM +0930, Qu Wenruo wrote: >> >> >> 在 2026/8/13 13:11, Tao Cui 写道: >>> From: Tao Cui <[email protected]> >>> >>> btrfs_ioctl_defrag() checks MAY_WRITE with nop_mnt_idmap, which skips >>> the mount idmap. On an idmapped mount the owner comparison then uses >>> the caller's fsuid against the raw on-disk uid, dropping the mapping. >>> Every other permission/owner check in btrfs ioctl uses >>> file_mnt_idmap(file) (e.g. :1152, :1310, :1946); this one missed it. >>> >>> Switch to file_mnt_idmap(file). It equals nop_mnt_idmap on a normal >>> mount, and the check stays behind !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN), so only >>> unprivileged callers on idmapped btrfs change. The RO-fd note in the >>> comment above is about the file descriptor, not this inode check, and >>> is unaffected. >>> >>> Signed-off-by: Tao Cui <[email protected]> >> >> Fixes: 4609e1f18e19 ("fs: port ->permission() to pass mnt_idmap") > > This is a misattribution. Using nop_mnt_idmap there keeps the behavior > the same as it was before the commit. Switching to the mount idmap opens > up BTRFS_IOC_DEFRAG* to idmapped users when they weren't before, which > is a separate policy decision that didn't belong in that change. OK, removed from for-next, and will not add the fixes tag. > > Saying that these ioctls should be allowed for idmapped users just > because others are isn't a good justification. Why are these ioctls safe > for idmapped users? Do they actually require this capability? I'll let the author to do the explanation. Thanks, Qu > > Thanks, > Seth >