Re: "For What It's Worth" (or How do I know my Gentoo source code hasn't been messed with?)

On Mon, Aug 4, 2014 at 6:04 PM, Mark Knecht <[email protected]> wrote:
>
> Essentially, what is the security model for all this source code and how do
> I verify that it hasn't been tampered with in some manner?

Duncan already gave a fairly comprehensive response.  I believe the
intent is to refactor and generally improve things when we move to
git.  Even today there aren't a lot of avenues for slipping code in
without compromising a gentoo server or manipulating your rsync data
transfer (if it isn't secured).

But...

> There's certainly lots of other issues about security, like protecting
> passwords, protecting physical access to the network and machines, root kits
> and the like, etc., but assuming none of that is in question (I don't have
> any reason to think the NSA has been in my home!) ;-) I'm looking for info
> on how the code is protected from the time it's signed off until it's built
> and running here.

You may very well be underestimating the NSA here.  It has already
come out that they hack into peoples systems just to get their ssh
keys to hack into other people's systems, even if the admins that
they're targeting aren't of any interest otherwise.  That is, you
don't have to be a suspected terrorist/etc to be on their list.

I run a relay-only tor node (which doesn't seem to keep everybody and
their uncle from blocking me as if I'm an exit node it seems).  I'd be
surprised if the NSA hasn't rooted my server just so that they can
monitor my tor traffic - if they did this to all the tor relays they
could monitor the entire network, so I would think that this would be
a priority for them.

To root your system the NSA doesn't have to compromise some Gentoo
server, or even tamper with your rsync feed.  The simplest solution
would be to just target a zero-day vulnerability in some software
you're running.  They might use a zero-day in some daemon that runs as
root, maybe a zero-day in the kernel network stack, or a zero-day in
your browser (those certainly exist) combined with a priv escalation
attack.  If they're just after your ssh keys they don't even need priv
escalation.  Those attacks don't require targeting Gentoo in
particular.

If your goal is to be safe from "the NSA" then I think you need to
fundamentally rethink your approach to security.  I'd recommend
verifying, signing, and verifying all code that runs (think iOS).  I
doubt that any linux distro is going to suit your needs unless you
just use it as a starting point for a fork.

However, I do think that Gentoo can do a better job of securing code
than it does today, and that is a worthwhile goal.  I doubt it would
stop the NSA, but we certainly can do something about lesser threats
that don't:
1.  Have a 12-figure budget.
2.  Have complete immunity from prosecution.
3.  Have an army of the best cryptographers in the world, etc.
4.  Have privileged access to the routers virtually all of your
traffic travels over.
5.  Have the ability to obtain things like trusted SSL certs at will
(though I don't think anybody has caught them doing this one).

In the early post-Snowden days I was more paranoid, but these days
I've basically given up worrying about the NSA.  After the ssh key
revelations I just assume they have root on my box - I just wish
they'd be nice enough to close up any other vulnerabilities they find
so that others don't get root, and maybe let me access whatever
backups they've made if for some reason I lose access to my own
backups.  I still try to keep things as secure as I can to keep
everybody else out, but hiding from the NSA is a tall order.

Oh yeah, if they have compromised my box you can assume they have my
Gentoo ssh key and password and gpg key if they actually want them...
:)

Rich