Re: Selinux: /bin/su and pam_selinux

On Sat, Jan 21, 2017 at 06:04:51PM +0000, Robert Sharp wrote:
>    AIM - to be able to su to root and switch off strict mode in case
>    something goes wrong. I was using newrole but I kept forgetting so I am
>    trying to use pam_selinux to change the role to sysadm_r. I followed
>    the instructions given at
>    [1]http://blog.siphos.be/2013/04/how-logins-get-their-selinux-user-cont
>    ext/ in general, but I had to do some research to find out how to apply
>    them for /bin/su.

Generally, such a change is best implemented through sudo rather than su.
With sudo, you have more control over role and type switching as well
(sudo is SELinux-aware, and not just through its PAM support).

Would that be an option for you? If not, then let's get into the details of
what you are noticing further...

>    The answer was in su.if, added to the "su_role_template" interface. I
>    then spent some time figuring out how to get the roles/sysadm module to
>    use my modified interface (put it in the same directory) and it
>    generally seemed to work. I got a few extra AVCs but I ended up with
>    the following:
> 
>            optional_policy(`
>                    domain_subj_id_change_exemption($1_su_t)
>                    domain_role_change_exemption($1_su_t)
>                    selinux_validate_context($1_su_t)
>                    selinux_compute_access_vector($1_su_t)
>                    selinux_compute_create_context($1_su_t)
>                    selinux_compute_relabel_context($1_su_t)
>                    selinux_compute_user_contexts($1_su_t)
>                    seutil_read_config($1_su_t)
>                    seutil_read_default_contexts($1_su_t)
>                    userdom_relabelto_user_ptys($1_su_t)
>                    userdom_dontaudit_relabelfrom_user_ptys($1_su_t)
>                    userdom_use_user_ptys($1_su_t)
>                    allow $1_su_t self:process setkeycreate;
>                    allow $1_su_t $3:key manage_key_perms;
>            ')

Note that, with this in place, you might be granting more people than you
originally intended to gain certain privileges.

>    The PROBLEM: I still get two AVCs that I don't think I should be
>    getting:
> 
>        type=PROCTITLE msg=audit(1485020695.038:10367):
>    proctitle=2F62696E2F7375002D
>        type=PATH msg=audit(1485020695.038:10367): item=0 name="/dev/pts/3"
>    inode=6 dev=00:12 mode=020620 ouid=501 ogid=5 rdev=88:03
>            obj=staff_u:object_r:user_devpts_t nametype=NORMAL
>        type=CWD msg=audit(1485020695.038:10367):
>    cwd="/home/robert/selinux/sysadm"
>        type=SYSCALL msg=audit(1485020695.038:10367): arch=c000003e
>    syscall=188 success=yes exit=0 a0=375183c820 a1=3817fb1fcaa
>            a2=375183bce0 a3=1c items=1 ppid=17744 pid=20374
>    auid=4294967295 uid=501 gid=0 euid=0 suid=0 fsuid=0 egid=0 sgid=0
>    fsgid=0 tty=pts3
>            ses=4294967295 comm="su" exe="/bin/su"
>    subj=staff_u:sysadm_r:sysadm_su_t key=(null)
>        type=AVC msg=audit(1485020695.038:10367): avc:  denied  { relabelto
>    } for  pid=20374 comm="su" name="3" dev="devpts" ino=6
>            scontext=staff_u:sysadm_r:sysadm_su_t
>    tcontext=root:object_r:user_devpts_t tclass=chr_file permissive=1
>    ----
>        type=AVC msg=audit(1485020695.038:10368): avc:  denied  { create }
>    for  pid=20374 comm="su" scontext=staff_u:sysadm_r:sysadm_su_t
>            tcontext=root:sysadm_r:sysadm_t tclass=key permissive=1
> 
>    I double checked that I had corresponding rules to allow these:
> 
>        # sesearch -s sysadm_su_t -t user_devpts_t -A
>        allow sysadm_su_t user_devpts_t:chr_file { read getattr write ioctl
>    relabelto open append };
> 
>        # sesearch -s sysadm_su_t -t sysadm_t -c key -A
>        allow sysadm_su_t sysadm_t:key { search setattr read create write
>    link view };
> 
>    So I really cannot see why I am getting these AVCs. I keep looking at
>    the scripts, the rules and the AVCs to see if I have done something
>    stupid, but I cannot see it. I have started making fairly arbitrary
>    changes to see if I can make it go away but I am just wasting time
>    really. If I cannot figure this out I suspect I will be ditching
>    pam_selinux and reverting to explicitly issuing newrole. I guess with
>    strict on I will quickly be reminded that I have forgotten to change
>    roles anyway.

As was mentioned in the thread already, this might be UBAC-related.

Wkr,
  Sven Vermeulen