Re: LUKS Header crruption
Milan Broz <[email protected]>
| Newsgroups | gmane.linux.kernel.device-mapper.dm-crypt |
|---|---|
| Message-ID | <[email protected]> |
On 29/07/2019 15:56, Robert Nichols wrote: > The key material is quite deliberately made just the opposite of > redundant. It is artificially inflated (typically 4000X) to occupy a > larger area of the disk, and in such a manner that successfully > erasing any portion of that area makes the key unrecoverable. Exactly. And this part is not changed even in LUKS2 (only metadata is stored twice). For LUKS2, we just store keyslots content in area with higher offset, seems that data corruption (caused by overwriting by random too-clever software) is not so common here (like for the keyslot 0 in LUKS1). Solution is to backup LUKS header. Milan _______________________________________________ dm-crypt mailing list [email protected] https://www.saout.de/mailman/listinfo/dm-crypt