Mastery Key and RAM burn-in

"[email protected]" <[email protected]>
Newsgroups gmane.linux.kernel.device-mapper.dm-crypt
Message-ID <[email protected]>
> Hi,
>
> I would suggest that Gutmann's insights (which were pretty 
> good when published) are pretty much outdated 18 years later.
> Manufacturing processes have changed and cell stability is
> vastly better than it was (or DRAMs would not survive very 
> long). It is not clear whether these attacks still work and
> how much effort they would be. 
>
> This attack is not a widespread concern in the security 
> community these days though. As far as I am aware (correct
> me if I am wrong), there is not a single instance where
> this attack was used successfully. 
>
> Anyways, this is not a LUKS or dm-Crypt issue. This is an
> issue with the kernel crypto services, I believe. loop-AES
> is kind of historic and still did its own crypto. That is
> not how things work these days.
>
> Regards,
> Arno
Alright thanks for making it clear. The only instance of a successful
attack was with a machine using SRAM which is antiquated.

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