[PATCH v3 3/4] landlock: Document LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_NO_NEW_PRIVS

Document setting no_new_privs with ruleset enforcement, following the
same compatibility section style as previous ABI additions.

Include a section explaining the tradeoffs of setting no_new_privs
through any means for privileged users of Landlock.

Signed-off-by: Justin Suess <[email protected]>
---

Notes:
    v2->v3:
    - Update the tutorial: restrict_flags per ABI version and prctl call
      skipped when LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_NO_NEW_PRIVS is used
    - Drop "Atomic" from the section title; describe the ordering instead
    - Explain that not setting no_new_privs is risky even when not required
    - Fix ABI 8/9 switch coverage (case 8 ... 10) and indentation

 Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst | 47 +++++++++++++++++++++---
 1 file changed, 41 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

diff --git a/Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst b/Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst
index 5085822d8930..0e4a73fd5ea4 100644
--- a/Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst
+++ b/Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ Landlock: unprivileged access control
 =====================================
 
 :Author: Mickaël Salaün
-:Date: July 2026
+:Date: August 2026
 
 The goal of Landlock is to enable restriction of ambient rights (e.g. global
 filesystem or network access) for a set of processes.  Because Landlock
@@ -250,7 +250,8 @@ similar backwards compatibility check is needed for the restrict flags
 
     __u32 restrict_flags =
         LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_LOG_NEW_EXEC_ON |
-        LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_TSYNC;
+        LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_TSYNC |
+        LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_NO_NEW_PRIVS;
     switch (abi) {
     case 1 ... 6:
         /* Removes logging flags for ABI < 7 */
@@ -269,16 +270,36 @@ similar backwards compatibility check is needed for the restrict flags
          * children (and not for all threads, including parents and siblings).
          */
         restrict_flags &= ~LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_TSYNC;
+        __attribute__((fallthrough));
+    case 8 ... 10:
+        /* Removes no new privs flag for ABI < 11 */
+        restrict_flags &= ~LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_NO_NEW_PRIVS;
     }
 
 The next step is to restrict the current thread from gaining more privileges
-(e.g. through a SUID binary).  We now have a ruleset with the first rule
-allowing read and execute access to ``/usr`` while denying all other handled
-accesses for the filesystem, and two more rules allowing DNS queries.
+(e.g. through a SUID binary).  For unprivileged processes, setting the
+no_new_privs attribute is required by Landlock.
+
+Processes with ``CAP_SYS_ADMIN`` in their namespace can enforce a ruleset
+without it, but not setting no_new_privs is risky even when it is not
+required: sandboxed processes could still execute set-user-ID, set-group-ID
+or file-capability binaries, which would then run with elevated privileges
+while being restricted by a Landlock domain they may not expect, making them
+potential confused deputies.  Setting no_new_privs should only be avoided if
+such a privilege transition is expected.
+
+We now have a ruleset with the first rule allowing read and execute access to
+``/usr`` while denying all other handled accesses for the filesystem, and two
+more rules allowing DNS queries.
 
 .. code-block:: c
 
-    if (prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0)) {
+    /*
+     * If the ABI > 10, we can tie setting no_new_privs with successful ruleset
+     * enforcement and skip the manual prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, ...) call.
+     */
+    if (!(restrict_flags & LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_NO_NEW_PRIVS) &&
+        prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0)) {
         perror("Failed to restrict privileges");
         close(ruleset_fd);
         return 1;
@@ -792,6 +813,20 @@ when at least one sys_landlock_add_rule() call is made for it with the
 ``LANDLOCK_ADD_RULE_QUIET`` flag, additional add-rule calls for the same
 object without this flag do not clear it.
 
+no_new_privs flag (ABI < 11)
+----------------------------
+
+Starting with the Landlock ABI version 11, sys_landlock_restrict_self()
+accepts the ``LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_NO_NEW_PRIVS`` flag, which sets the
+no_new_privs attribute of the calling thread only once the enforcement of
+the ruleset succeeded: no_new_privs is set if and only if the call
+succeeds.  This removes the need for a prior :manpage:`prctl(2)`
+``PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS`` call, and with it the ``CAP_SYS_ADMIN``
+requirement.  When combined with ``LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_TSYNC``,
+no_new_privs is set on all threads of the process.  As explained in the
+tutorial above, not setting no_new_privs is risky even when it is not
+required.
+
 .. _kernel_support:
 
 Kernel support
-- 
2.54.0