[BLFS Trac] #23422: vim-9.2.0597 (Security Update)

#23422: vim-9.2.0597 (Security Update)
-----------------------------+-----------------------
 Reporter:  Douglas R. Reno  |      Owner:  blfs-book
     Type:  enhancement      |     Status:  new
 Priority:  normal           |  Milestone:  13.1
Component:  BOOK             |    Version:  git
 Severity:  normal           |   Keywords:
-----------------------------+-----------------------
 This fixes another arbitrary code execution issue in the Python omni-
 completion functionality:

 {{{
 Arbitrary Code Execution via Python Omni-Completion in Vim < 9.2.597
 ====================================================================

 Date: 2026-06-04
 Severity: Medium
 CVE: *requested, not yet assigned*
 CWE: Improper Control of Generation of Code (CWE-94)

 ## Summary

 Vim's Python omni-completion executes reconstructed function and class
 definitions from the current buffer with `exec()` as part of populating
 the completion dictionary. Python evaluates function default values,
 parameter annotations, and class base expressions at definition time,
 so a hostile buffer can execute attacker-controlled Python expressions
 during omni-completion. The existing `g:pythoncomplete_allow_import`
 mitigation (GHSA-52mc-rq6p-rc7c) does not cover this path, because the
 attacker-controlled code is not a harvested `import`/`from` statement.

 ## Description

 In `runtime/autoload/python3complete.vim` (and the legacy
 `pythoncomplete.vim`), the omni-completion entry point calls
 `exec(src, self.compldict)` on source reconstructed from the parsed
 buffer. The reconstructed source includes function definitions whose
 parameter lists are joined verbatim from tokens harvested by the
 internal `_parenparse()` helper, which preserves default expressions
 and annotations as written in the buffer. The same applies to class
 base lists. When `exec()` runs the reconstructed `def` and `class`
 statements, Python evaluates those expressions.

 ## Impact

 An attacker who can convince a user to open or edit a hostile Python
 buffer and trigger Python omni-completion (CTRL-X CTRL-O, or a plugin
 that invokes the completion function) can execute Python code in the
 user's Vim process. The code runs with the user's privileges.

 Vim built without `+python3` and `+python` is not affected. Triggering
 omni-completion in the hostile buffer is required; opening the file
 alone is not sufficient.

 ## Acknowledgements

 The Vim project would like to thank github user DavidCarliez for
 reporting and analyzing the issue.

 ## References

 The issue has been fixed as of Vim patch
 [v9.2.597](https://github.com/vim/vim/releases/tag/v9.2.0597).
 -
 [Commit](https://github.com/vim/vim/commit/c8c63673bc4253212820626aeeb75999d9a539d2)
 - [Github Security
 Advisory](https://github.com/vim/vim/security/advisories/GHSA-
 65p9-mwwx-7468)
 - [Github Security Advisory GHSA-52mc-rq6p-
 rc7c](https://github.com/vim/vim/security/advisories/GHSA-52mc-rq6p-rc7c)
   (prior mitigation for the same surface)
 }}}
-- 
Ticket URL: <https://wiki.linuxfromscratch.org/blfs/ticket/23422>
BLFS Trac <https://wiki.linuxfromscratch.org/blfs/>
Beyond Linux From Scratch

-- 
http://lists.linuxfromscratch.org/sympa/info/blfs-book
Unsubscribe: See the above information page