Re: [BLFS Trac] #23735: openssh-10.5p1

BLFS Trac ([email protected] via blfs-book Mailing List) <[email protected]>
Newsgroups gmane.linux.lfs.beyond.book
Message-ID <[email protected]>
#23735: openssh-10.5p1
-------------------------+-------------------------------
 Reporter:  Bruce Dubbs  |       Owner:  SecurityAdvisory
     Type:  enhancement  |      Status:  new
 Priority:  elevated     |   Milestone:  98-Security
Component:  BOOK         |     Version:  git
 Severity:  medium       |  Resolution:
 Keywords:               |
-------------------------+-------------------------------
Changes (by Joe Locash):

 * milestone:  13.1 => 98-Security
 * owner:  Joe Locash => SecurityAdvisory
 * priority:  normal => elevated
 * severity:  normal => medium
 * status:  assigned => new

Comment:

 {{{
 OpenSSH 10.5 was released on 2026-08-11. It is available from the
 mirrors listed at https://www.openssh.com/.
 OpenSSH is a 100% complete SSH protocol 2.0 implementation and
 includes sftp client and server support.

 Recently the OpenSSH team have received a large number of security
 bug reports, many of which are findings from AI models or made with
 AI assistance. While many AI reports are determined not to have
 security impact when considered in the context of a realistic
 threat model, we very much welcome these reports, especially when
 combined with human triage, analysis, test-cases and particularly
 when accompanied by proposed fixes.

 We have seen a number of cases where a security bug identified by
 AI tools is subsequently independently discovered by a different
 researcher. This suggests that adversaries who do not report bugs
 to OSS projects are likely to be able to discover these bugs too.
 Given this, the OpenSSH team will, for now, be making more frequent
 releases to get bugfixes into users' hands more quickly rather than
 batching them until the next planned release.

 Once again, we would like to thank the OpenSSH community for their
 continued support of the project, especially those who contributed
 code or patches, reported bugs, tested snapshots or donated to the
 project. More information on donations may be found at:
 https://www.openssh.com/donations.html

 Potentially-incompatible changes
 --------------------------------

  * Portable OpenSSH now requires ECC (Elliptic Curve Cryptography)
    support in libcrypto, including support for the NISTP521 curve.
    ECC is included in the default build configurations of all
    versions of all libcrypto implementations currently supported by
    OpenSSH, including LibreSSL, OpenSSL, BoringSSL and AWS LC.
    The --without-openssl build configuration is not affected.

 Changes since OpenSSH 10.4
 ==========================

 This release contains a number of security fixes and small bugfixes.

 Security
 ========

  * ssh-agent(1): fix an interaction between agent locking and the
    [email protected] extension that is used to identify
    forwarded agents. These binding requests were refused when the
    agent was locked, with the result that operations that were
    intended to be limited to local use only could be performed
    remotely, including the ability to add PKCS#11 tokens and make
    use of keys that had destination restrictions applied.
    Reported by sn0x-sharma

  * ssh(1): avoid potential realloc use-after-free in the client if a
    remote forwarding is added via the local session multiplexing
    socket while a remote forwarding open request is pending with the
    server. Report and fix from Brian Mingus of Cognatory

  * sshd(8): make the authorized_keys "restrict" keyword apply
    correctly to tunnel forwarding too (which is administratively
    disabled by default). Reported by Erichen, Institute of Computing
    Technology, Chinese Academy of Sciences

 New features
 ------------

  * ssh-keygen(1): add ability to set or clear the touch-required and
    verify-required flags on FIDO private keys when resetting a
    private key's passphrase.

  * ssh(1): tweak ordering of certificates tried during pubkey
     authentication to prefer FIDO keys that do not require user
     presence (touch) first, and FIDO keys that require user
     verification via PIN or biometrics last. This effectively tries
     low-friction authenticators before higher friction ones.

  * ssh(1): add a "ssh -Z user@host" mode that prints the keys that
    will be tried for public key authentication in the order that
    they will be used.

  * sshd(8) use setproctitle(3) to identify sshd-session when its
    acting as a post-authentication monitor.

 Bugfixes
 --------

  * ssh-keyscan(1): make reading the server banner a non-blocking
    operation to prevent a stuck server from blocking a many-host
    keyscan from proceeding.

  * sshd(8): use sshpkt_fatal() instead of plain fatal() for errors
    in the packet code as this provides context of the failing peer
    (address, port, user, etc).

  * sshd(8): when signing hostkey proofs for a client UpdateHostKeys
    request, allow each hostkey to perform at most one signature
    operation.

  * sshd(8) fix GSSAPI option names, that were broken during a
    servconf.c refactoring in openssh-10.4; bz3974.

  * ssh-keygen(1): pass back errors from ed25519 key generation, which
    theoretically can fail. GHPR702.

  * sshd(8): move check of public key type against allowed algorithms
    to before parsing of the key sent by the peer. This removes at
    least some key parsing and verification paths from the pre-auth
    attack surface. Suggested by Christopher Paul Rohlf of Anthropic.

  * ssh-keygen(1): fix double frees (impossible to reach outside of a
    test harness), and also use freezero where possible. From
    Christopher Paul Rohlf at Anthropic.

  * sshd(8): fix ChannelTimeout and RekeyLimit not being applied in
    sshd_config Match blocks.

  * sshd(8): in sshd config dump mode, write all directives in mixed
    case for consistency

 Portability
 -----------

  * sshd(8): re-allow PAMServiceName inside a Match block, which
    was incorrectly disabled during a refactoring in openssh-10.4.
    bz3987
 }}}
 CVE's have been assigned:
   - ssh-agent(1): https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-73281
   - ssh(1): https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-73282
   - sshd(8): https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-73283
 Fixed at [sha:e558607bff]. Leaving open for SA.
-- 
Ticket URL: <https://wiki.linuxfromscratch.org/blfs/ticket/23735#comment:2>
BLFS Trac <https://wiki.linuxfromscratch.org/blfs/>
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