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#5760: vim-9.1.1552 (Security update)
-------------------------+----------------------
Reporter: Bruce Dubbs | Owner: lfs-book
Type: enhancement | Status: new
Priority: normal | Milestone: 12.4
Component: Book | Version: git
Severity: normal | Keywords:
-------------------------+----------------------
Two security vulnerabilities were reported as fixed today:
{{{
path traversal issue with tar.vim and special crafted tar archives in Vim
< 9.1.1552
====================================================================================
Date: 15.07.2025
Severity: Low
CVE: CVE-2025-53905
CWE: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path
Traversal') (CWE-22)
### Summary
A path traversal issue in Vim’s tar.vim plugin can allow overwriting of
arbitrary files when opening specially crafted tar archives.
### Description
Vim includes the tar.vim plugin, which enables viewing and editing of
files
within tar (and compressed tar) archives.
An attacker can create a tar archive that contains member files with
relative
paths (e.g., ../../somefile). If such an archive is opened in Vim, and the
user
saves one of these malicious files, Vim may overwrite files outside the
intended working directory.
Exploitation requires several conditions:
- The user opens a specially crafted archive in Vim.
- The user selects and attempts to edit one of the files within the
archive.
- Vim writes the file back to disk using :w!.
Only after all these steps are performed would Vim overwrite an existing
file
on disk.
**Note**:
- Vim does display the full path to be written, so a careful user may
notice
suspicious behavior.
- Standard tar utilities typically do not extract such paths and will warn
or
skip them. This issue only affects Vim's internal handling, not the tar
tool
itself.
### Proof of Concept
As a Proof of Concept, the following code crafts a malicious archive:
```
echo pwned > pwn; tar --transform='s|^|/etc/ax-|' -cf evil.tar pwn
```
If the file contained in the evil.tar archive is edited through vim,
typing
':w' to save it will create /etc/ax-pwn on the host filesystem (provided
that
the user has sufficient permissions to write into the /etc directory.
### Impact
Impact is **low** because this exploit requires direct user interaction:
However successfully exploitation can lead to overwritint sensitive files
or
placing executable code in privileged locations, depending on the
permissions
of the process editing the archive.
The victim must edit such a file using Vim which will reveal the filename
and the file content, a careful user may suspect some strange things going
on.
Successful exploitation could results in the ability to execute
arbitrary commands on the underlying operating system.
The Vim project would like to thank @ax for reporting this issue.
The issue has been fixed as of Vim patch v9.1.1552
[Commit](https://github.com/vim/vim/commit/87757c6b0a4b2c1f71c72ea8e1438b8fb116b239)
[Github Advisory](https://github.com/vim/vim/security/advisories/GHSA-
74v4-f3x9-ppvr)
}}}
and
{{{path traversal issue with zip.vim and special crafted zip archives in
Vim < v9.1.1551
=====================================================================================
Date: 15.07.2025
Severity: Low
CVE: CVE-2025-53906
CWE: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path
Traversal') (CWE-22)
### Summary
A path traversal issue in Vim’s zip.vim plugin can allow overwriting of
arbitrary files when opening specially crafted zip archives.
### Description
Vim includes the zip.vim plugin, which enables viewing and editing of
files
within zip archives.
An attacker can create a zip archive that contains member files with
relative
paths (e.g., ../../somefile). If such an archive is opened in Vim, and the
user
saves one of these malicious files, Vim may overwrite files outside the
intended working directory.
Exploitation requires several conditions:
- The user opens a specially crafted archive in Vim.
- The user selects and attempts to edit one of the files within the
archive.
- Vim writes the file back to disk using :w!.
Only after all these steps are performed would Vim overwrite an existing
file
on disk.
**Note**:
- Vim does display the full path to be written, so a careful user may
notice
suspicious behavior.
- Standard zip utility typically do not extract such paths and will warn
or
skip them. This issue only affects Vim's internal handling, not the zip
tool
itself.
### Proof of Concept
As a Proof of Concept, the following code crafts a malicious archive:
```python
import zipfile
import os
zip_path='evil.zip'
fname='file'
arcname='/etc/ax-pwn'
arcname='../../../../etc/ax-pwn'
with open(fname, 'w') as f:
f.write(f"pwned\n")
with zipfile.ZipFile(zip_path, 'w') as zipf:
zipf.write(fname, arcname)
print(f"Created {zip_path}" )
```
If the file contained in the evil.zip archive is edited through vim,
typing
':w' to save it will create /etc/ax-pwn on the host filesystem (provided
that
the user has sufficient permissions to write into the /etc directory.
### Impact
Impact is **low** because this exploit requires direct user interaction:
However successfully exploitation can lead to overwriting sensitive files
or
placing executable code in privileged locations, depending on the
permissions
of the process editing the archive.
The victim must edit such a file using Vim which will reveal the filename
and the file content, a careful user may suspect some strange things going
on.
Successful exploitation could results in the ability to execute
arbitrary commands on the underlying operating system.
The Vim project would like to thank @ax for reporting this issue.
The issue has been fixed as of Vim patch v9.1.1551
}}}
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