Re: sysklogd security patch

On Sat, 2003-07-19 at 11:17, Archaic wrote:
> On Sat, Jul 19, 2003 at 02:04:28PM +0100, Matthew Burgess wrote:
> > Just seen this posted at
> > http://www.infodrom.org/projects/sysklogd/download/patches/.  It
> > enables sysklogd to be run as an unprivileged user by giving it a -u
> > <username> parameter.  Not sure this is useful for LFS or not, just
> > thought I'd raise awareness of it.
> 
> Perhaps this should be posted to lfs-security as well. Since the book
> itself usually doesn't deal with security configuration.

(CCing to lfs-security)

This has been in my lil' list o' hardening procedures for awhile now, so
I've got a reasonable level of faith in the patch--although admins
should read the new version of the man page very carefully because
there's a few gotchas that can getcha, so to speak.

There _have_ been format string exploits to syslogd in the past, so this
is a pretty decent improvement for what little extra work it entails.

(I'm _very_ big on the use of non-root role ids for anything users can
put their filthy little fingers on and push.)
 
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