Re: [PATCH net v6 1/3] net: remove CAP_SYS_RAWIO zero-padding in dev_validate_header
Willem de Bruijn <[email protected]> Tue, 04 Aug 2026 08:16:35 -0400
| Newsgroups | gmane.linux.network,gmane.linux.kernel.stable |
|---|---|
| Message-ID | <[email protected]> |
Qihang wrote: > From: Qihang Tang <[email protected]> > > dev_validate_header() reads dev->hard_header_len directly when > zero-padding short link layer headers for CAP_SYS_RAWIO holders: > > if (capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO)) { > memset(ll_header + len, 0, dev->hard_header_len - len); > return true; > } > > Packet send paths call dev_validate_header() on skbs whose headroom was > allocated from an earlier hard_header_len read. If the device is > reconfigured so that dev->hard_header_len increases before validation, > the memset writes past the reserved buffer, an out-of-bounds write. > > This out-of-bounds write is masked in some SOCK_RAW paths today because > the same concurrent increase can first make skb_push() exceed the > reserved headroom and trigger skb_under_panic(). Remove the zero-padding > branch before making those hard_header_len reads consistent, so the > snapshot fixes do not turn a loud panic into a silent overwrite. > > This path is only reached for variable length L2 protocols, where > len < hard_header_len but len >= min_header_len. No remaining in-tree > variable length L2 protocol implements header_ops->validate, and the > CAP_SYS_RAWIO bypass that zero-pads and accepts short headers has no > real value beyond allowing testing of intentionally malformed input. > > Drop the CAP_SYS_RAWIO branch. The remaining reads of > dev->hard_header_len in dev_validate_header() are comparisons only and > have no memory safety impact. > > Suggested-by: Willem de Bruijn <[email protected]> > Fixes: 2793a23aacbd ("net: validate variable length ll headers") > Cc: [email protected] > Signed-off-by: Qihang Tang <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Willem de Bruijn <[email protected]> For future patches: don't send new revisions as replies to existing threads.