Re: [PATCH v4 1/9] capabilities: introduce CAP_SYS_PERFMON to kernel and user space
Stephen Smalley <[email protected]> Wed, 18 Dec 2019 14:56:33 -0500
| Newsgroups | gmane.linux.kernel,gmane.linux.kernel.lsm,gmane.comp.freedesktop.xorg.drivers.intel,gmane.linux.ports.parisc,gmane.linux.ports.ppc64.devel,gmane.linux.kernel.perf.user,gmane.linux.ports.arm.kernel,gmane.linux.oprofile |
|---|---|
| Message-ID | <[email protected]> |
On 12/18/19 4:24 AM, Alexey Budankov wrote: > > Introduce CAP_SYS_PERFMON capability devoted to secure system performance > monitoring and observability operations so that CAP_SYS_PERFMON would > assist CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability in its governing role for perf_events, > i915_perf and other subsystems of the kernel. > > CAP_SYS_PERFMON intends to harden system security and integrity during > system performance monitoring and observability operations by decreasing > attack surface that is available to CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileged processes. > > CAP_SYS_PERFMON intends to take over CAP_SYS_ADMIN credentials related > to system performance monitoring and observability operations and balance > amount of CAP_SYS_ADMIN credentials in accordance with the recommendations > provided in the man page for CAP_SYS_ADMIN [1]: "Note: this capability > is overloaded; see Notes to kernel developers, below." > > [1] http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man7/capabilities.7.html > > Signed-off-by: Alexey Budankov <[email protected]> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <[email protected]> Note for selinux developers: we will need to update the selinux-testsuite tests for perf_event when/if this change lands upstream. > --- > include/linux/capability.h | 4 ++++ > include/uapi/linux/capability.h | 8 +++++++- > security/selinux/include/classmap.h | 4 ++-- > 3 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/include/linux/capability.h b/include/linux/capability.h > index ecce0f43c73a..883c879baa4b 100644 > --- a/include/linux/capability.h > +++ b/include/linux/capability.h > @@ -251,6 +251,10 @@ extern bool privileged_wrt_inode_uidgid(struct user_namespace *ns, const struct > extern bool capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(const struct inode *inode, int cap); > extern bool file_ns_capable(const struct file *file, struct user_namespace *ns, int cap); > extern bool ptracer_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, struct user_namespace *ns); > +static inline bool perfmon_capable(void) > +{ > + return capable(CAP_SYS_PERFMON) || capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN); > +} > > /* audit system wants to get cap info from files as well */ > extern int get_vfs_caps_from_disk(const struct dentry *dentry, struct cpu_vfs_cap_data *cpu_caps); > diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/capability.h b/include/uapi/linux/capability.h > index 240fdb9a60f6..98e03cc76c7c 100644 > --- a/include/uapi/linux/capability.h > +++ b/include/uapi/linux/capability.h > @@ -366,8 +366,14 @@ struct vfs_ns_cap_data { > > #define CAP_AUDIT_READ 37 > > +/* > + * Allow system performance and observability privileged operations > + * using perf_events, i915_perf and other kernel subsystems > + */ > + > +#define CAP_SYS_PERFMON 38 > > -#define CAP_LAST_CAP CAP_AUDIT_READ > +#define CAP_LAST_CAP CAP_SYS_PERFMON > > #define cap_valid(x) ((x) >= 0 && (x) <= CAP_LAST_CAP) > > diff --git a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h > index 7db24855e12d..bae602c623b0 100644 > --- a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h > +++ b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h > @@ -27,9 +27,9 @@ > "audit_control", "setfcap" > > #define COMMON_CAP2_PERMS "mac_override", "mac_admin", "syslog", \ > - "wake_alarm", "block_suspend", "audit_read" > + "wake_alarm", "block_suspend", "audit_read", "sys_perfmon" > > -#if CAP_LAST_CAP > CAP_AUDIT_READ > +#if CAP_LAST_CAP > CAP_SYS_PERFMON > #error New capability defined, please update COMMON_CAP2_PERMS. > #endif > >