Re: [PATCH v4 5/9] trace/bpf_trace: open access for CAP_SYS_PERFMON privileged process
Song Liu <[email protected]> Mon, 13 Jan 2020 20:47:04 +0000
| Newsgroups | gmane.linux.ports.arm.kernel,gmane.linux.oprofile,gmane.comp.freedesktop.xorg.drivers.intel,gmane.linux.ports.parisc,gmane.linux.kernel,gmane.linux.kernel.perf.user,gmane.linux.kernel.lsm,gmane.linux.ports.ppc64.devel |
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| Message-ID | <[email protected]> |
> On Dec 18, 2019, at 1:28 AM, Alexey Budankov <[email protected]> wrote: > > > Open access to bpf_trace monitoring for CAP_SYS_PERFMON privileged > processes. For backward compatibility reasons access to bpf_trace > monitoring remains open for CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileged processes but > CAP_SYS_ADMIN usage for secure bpf_trace monitoring is discouraged > with respect to CAP_SYS_PERFMON capability. > > Signed-off-by: Alexey Budankov <[email protected]> Acked-by: Song Liu <[email protected]> > --- > kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c | 2 +- > 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) > > diff --git a/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c b/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c > index 44bd08f2443b..bafe21ac6d92 100644 > --- a/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c > +++ b/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c > @@ -1272,7 +1272,7 @@ int perf_event_query_prog_array(struct perf_event *event, void __user *info) > u32 *ids, prog_cnt, ids_len; > int ret; > > - if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) > + if (!perfmon_capable()) > return -EPERM; > if (event->attr.type != PERF_TYPE_TRACEPOINT) > return -EINVAL; I guess we need to fix this check for kprobe/uprobe created with perf_event_open()... Thanks, Song