Re: [PATCH v7 02/12] perf/core: open access to the core for CAP_PERFMON privileged process
James Morris <[email protected]> Wed, 19 Feb 2020 06:22:19 +1100 (AEDT)
| Newsgroups | gmane.linux.ports.arm.kernel,gmane.linux.man,gmane.linux.documentation,gmane.linux.oprofile,gmane.comp.freedesktop.xorg.drivers.intel,gmane.linux.ports.parisc,gmane.linux.kernel,gmane.linux.kernel.lsm,gmane.linux.ports.ppc64.devel |
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| Message-ID | <[email protected]> |
On Mon, 17 Feb 2020, Alexey Budankov wrote: > > Open access to monitoring of kernel code, cpus, tracepoints and > namespaces data for a CAP_PERFMON privileged process. Providing the > access under CAP_PERFMON capability singly, without the rest of > CAP_SYS_ADMIN credentials, excludes chances to misuse the credentials > and makes operation more secure. > > CAP_PERFMON implements the principal of least privilege for performance > monitoring and observability operations (POSIX IEEE 1003.1e 2.2.2.39 > principle of least privilege: A security design principle that states > that a process or program be granted only those privileges (e.g., > capabilities) necessary to accomplish its legitimate function, and only > for the time that such privileges are actually required) > > For backward compatibility reasons access to perf_events subsystem > remains open for CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileged processes but CAP_SYS_ADMIN > usage for secure perf_events monitoring is discouraged with respect to > CAP_PERFMON capability. > > Signed-off-by: Alexey Budankov <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: James Morris <[email protected]> -- James Morris <[email protected]>