Re: F45 Change Proposal: Disable in Kernel Crypto Userspace API (Phase 1) (self-contained)

Ondrej Kozina via devel <[email protected]> Fri, 24 Jul 2026 11:56:22 +0200
Newsgroups gmane.linux.redhat.fedora.devel
Message-ID <[email protected]>
On 23/07/2026 20:13, Justin Forbes wrote:
> On Thu, Jul 23, 2026 at 3:59 AM Ondrej Kozina via devel
>>
>> Ok, public awareness aside (which I agree with), are there any Fedora
>> specific steps planned above what the upstream kernel plans to do?
> 
> Somewhat. I do plan to disable it completely for F46. If upstream
> doesn't do so first, it can still be enabled in F45, but that will be
> the last release.

The upstream has a plan for restricted mode with allow list for AF_ALG 
and there's a clear justification for it (links below). I currently do 
not follow why this is not enough for Fedora going forward, so I'd like 
to hear more if we want to go further then that.

My arguments against turning the AF_ALG _completely_, without 
replacement are as follows:

- there's no xts mode implemented for camellia, serpent and twofish 
ciphers in openssl (I mention only the most used AES alternatives). So 
the cryptsetup (in Fedora) will loose userspace access to those ciphers 
without CAP_SYS_ADMIN. Affects LUKS2.

- No Adiantum in userspace crypto libraries currently supported by 
libcryptsetup. The fallback via dm-crypt will again need CAP_SYS_ADMIN. 
Affects LUKS2.

- Limited support for truecrypt/veracrypt containers. Only ciphers 
available in userspace crypto libraries remains usable. No dm-cryt 
fallback possible. Again, look at missing support for xts mode above.

The AES is default and will be, but there are use cases where AES is not 
a good fit (low end embedded devices with no HW support) and if you turn 
the AF_ALG off completely, it will cause headache.

- no cryptsetup benchmark for block ciphers (no replacement even with 
CAP_SYS_ADMIN). Though, I'd not personally deem it critical.

O.

[1]
- allow list: 
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-crypto/[email protected]/

- extended allow_list for other use cases: 
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-crypto/[email protected]/

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