Troubles catching CAP_SYS_ADMIN?, and MAC questions
Javier Juan Martínez Cabezón <[email protected]>
| Newsgroups | gmane.linux.rsbac |
|---|---|
| Message-ID | <CAD98N_F7wtEyGb0_Ry8kRwd-Nd_LSDRdCOcj9XHRHGz4GCxu_g@mail.gmail.com> |
Amon why CAP_SYS_ADMIN gives so much troubles to get catched?, any others doesn't get this troubles: While testing cap_learning_mode: 203|capable(): pid 1901(dmesg), uid 0: add missing user max_cap NONE to transaction 0 204|capable(): pid 1901(dmesg), uid 0: add missing user max_cap SYS_ADMIN to transaction 0 It seems system gets confused with CAP_SYS_ADMIN capable questions The second question: I'm wrong if I think that accessing to SCD (sysctl) at a MODIFY_SYSTEM_DATA way under MAC is permitted only to the global (non RC) admin role? Why is not permitted to secoff role too? Related to the ds-property, does MAC just check dac_permissions or does it check also RC permissions? I think that only the first one is checked and others hardcoded, it is?. If so, it's planned to get extended to RC access control?. I think extending MAC to RC would be useful for example to permit for example the role sysctl_r (and not global admin_r) to write proc variables since MODIFY_SYSTEM_DATA is present in ds (so RC has permitted role sysctl_r to modify_system_data to SCD sysctl, so ds-property check passed) What would happen in a scenary if DAC is disabled with MAC active? ds-property always granted?