Re: Apparmor suggestion to include more profiles
Marcus Meissner <[email protected]> Mon, 30 May 2016 13:42:38 +0200
| Newsgroups | gmane.linux.suse.security |
|---|---|
| Organization | SUSE Linux GmbH, GF: Felix Imendörffer, Jane Smithard, Graham Norton, HRB 212 84 (AG Nürnberg) |
| Message-ID | <[email protected]> |
On Mon, May 30, 2016 at 11:25:45AM +0200, Johannes Meixner wrote: > > Hello, > > perhaps off topic - more a question from someone > who does not know any internals about AppArmor: > > On May 29 18:10 Christian Boltz wrote (excerpt): > >This is a general problem with profiles for desktop > >applications. > >As soon as an application comes with File - Open > >or File - Save as menu items, the profile can > >a) allow opening and saving files from a specified set > > of directories (for example, the Ubuntu firefox profile > > AFAIK allows saving files only to ~/download/). > > Unfortunately this will terribly annoy users. > >b) allow opening and saving files everywhere, which makes > > the profile pretty useless > > I think when there is an explicit dialog whereto the > application will save a file or wherefrom the application > will read a file, there should be no need for additional > restrictions because the user can see and confirm what > file will be used and by standard Unix permissions > a normal user cannot damage other user's data > (basically "the system" is root's data). > > In contrast when an application reads or writes files > unnoticed by the user then I would like to have some > restrictions set up so that the application cannot > do "bad things". > > In particular I would like that an application cannot > unnoticed replace existing files (e.g. replace my > private data by something else) and that an application > cannot unnoticed read arbitrary files (e.g. read my > private data and send it to someone in the Internet). > > Is such a setup possibe with AppArmor? No. > I wonder how AppArmor (or any external tool) could know > whether or not an application reads or writes files > unnoticed versus via an explicit user confirmation dialog? Apparmor is implemented by static file/directory path whitelisting rules in the kernel, it cannot distinguish between a user wanted action and malicious one (e.g. if there is a dialog or not). Ciao, Marcus -- To unsubscribe, e-mail: [email protected] To contact the owner, e-mail: [email protected]