Re: Apparmor suggestion to include more profiles

Marcus Meissner <[email protected]> Mon, 30 May 2016 13:42:38 +0200
Newsgroups gmane.linux.suse.security
Organization SUSE Linux GmbH, GF: Felix Imendörffer, Jane Smithard, Graham Norton, HRB 212 84 (AG Nürnberg)
Message-ID <[email protected]>
On Mon, May 30, 2016 at 11:25:45AM +0200, Johannes Meixner wrote:
> 
> Hello,
> 
> perhaps off topic - more a question from someone
> who does not know any internals about AppArmor:
> 
> On May 29 18:10 Christian Boltz wrote (excerpt):
> >This is a general problem with profiles for desktop
> >applications.
> >As soon as an application comes with File - Open
> >or File - Save as menu items, the profile can
> >a) allow opening and saving files from a specified set
> >   of directories (for example, the Ubuntu firefox profile
> >   AFAIK allows saving files only to ~/download/).
> >   Unfortunately this will terribly annoy users.
> >b) allow opening and saving files everywhere, which makes
> >   the profile pretty useless
> 
> I think when there is an explicit dialog whereto the
> application will save a file or wherefrom the application
> will read a file, there should be no need for additional
> restrictions because the user can see and confirm what
> file will be used and by standard Unix permissions
> a normal user cannot damage other user's data
> (basically "the system" is root's data).
> 
> In contrast when an application reads or writes files
> unnoticed by the user then I would like to have some
> restrictions set up so that the application cannot
> do "bad things".
> 
> In particular I would like that an application cannot
> unnoticed replace existing files (e.g. replace my
> private data by something else) and that an application
> cannot unnoticed read arbitrary files (e.g. read my
> private data and send it to someone in the Internet).
> 
> Is such a setup possibe with AppArmor?

No.

 
> I wonder how AppArmor (or any external tool) could know
> whether or not an application reads or writes files
> unnoticed versus via an explicit user confirmation dialog?

Apparmor is implemented by static file/directory path whitelisting rules
in the kernel, it cannot distinguish between a user wanted action
and malicious one (e.g. if there is a dialog or not).

Ciao, Marcus
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